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Case No. 20160797-SC
INTI-IE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR,
Petitioner/Appellant,
V.

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Noor appeals from summary judgment against him and the denial of
post-conviction relief. The Utah Court of Appeals certified Noor' s case for
this Court's review. The Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A3-102(3)(b).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Introduction
The Postconviction Remedy Act's one-year statute of limitations
requires that petitioners act diligently to present all of the facts that form the
basis of their claims for relief in a timely petition. This legislative timing
requirement fosters repose, stability, and public faith in the justice system by
bringing finality to crhninal convictions and state judg1nents.
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Noor filed a timely prose petition, but after the district court appointed
him pro bona counsel, he filed an amended petition that omitted all claims
he had raised in the original and substituted new claims that had nothing in
common with the original ones other than the trial itself and his trial
attorney's general effectiveness. Noor filed the amended petition over a year
and a half after the statute of limitations elapsed on those claims.
Issue: Did the district court correctly determine that Noor's amended

post-conviction petition, whose core pleaded facts either differed from or
directly contradicted those in his original petition, was time barred under the
Postconviction Remedy Act's statute of limitations?

Standard of Re11iezv. An appellate court reviews a dish·ict court's grant
of summary judgment for correctness. Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, 'if 6, 323
P.3d 998.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106 (PCRA's procedural bars)
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107 (PCRA's statute of limitations)
Utah R. Civ. P. 15 (Amended and supplemental pleadings)
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (Post-conviction relief)

-2-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts. 1

Some time after 10:00 p.m., Noor, a Somali immigrant who was then a
resident of the Lorna Doane apartments, banged on a neighbor's door.
CR137:71-72. 2

Loud music played through the open door of Noor's

apartment. CR137:73. Because it was during the apartment's "quiet hours,"
the manager, J.E., who lived across the hall, told Noor to turn his music down
and to stop banging on the door or she would call the police. CR137:67, 7374. J.E. noticed "a glass jug of some type of alcohol" in Noor's apartment; she
also smelled alcohol on Noor. CR137:74.
As J.E. turned to reenter her open apartment door, Noor went in before
her and sat on her couch. CR137:75. J.E. repeatedly asked and gestured for
Noor to leave, but Noor remained on her couch, professing his love for her.
CR137:75-76. When J.E. did not respond, Noor stood and, walking a few feet
to the living room closet, shed his clothes. Td. Noor pointed to his erect penis

The trial facts are recited "in a light most favorable" to the jury
verdict. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,I 2, 128 P.3d 1171.
1

2

The State cites to the underlying criminal record as "CR[page #]" and
to the record for this post-conviction appeal as "PCR[page#]."

-3-
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and said he was a man and loved her. CR137:77. J.E. told Noor to get dressed
and leave or she would call the police. CR137:78.
J.E. then tried to enter her bedroom to get her cell phone. Id. As she
passed Noor, he grabbed her and pulled her down on top of him on the
couch. Id. While J.E. struggled to free herself from Noor' s grasp, he tried to
kiss her and to" get [her] to engage with him, with his face, and with ... his
body." CR137:79. J.E. momentarily freed herself and ran into her bedroom.
CR137:80.
She returned to the living room with her cell phone and called the
police. CR137:81. While she was on the telephone with the dispatcher, Noor,
who had redressed, put his arms around her and h·ied to kiss her. Id.

J.E.

resisted his advances and asked for police assistance to get Noor out of her
aparhnent. Id. Police dispatch assured her that officers were on the way.
CR137:81-83.
After hanging up, J.E. again tried to evade Noor's advances, but he
"went down on his knees" with "his arms around [her] bottom." CR137:8384. Noor then pulled J.E. forward, holding her buttocks, and "stuck his face
into [her] crotch, [simulating] ... oral sex with his tongue." CR137:84-85.

J.E.

pulled away, but Noor pushed her up against a wall, held her arms, and
"continued to try to kiss [her] and push his body against" hers. CR137:85-86.

-4-
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As J.E. fought to free herself, Noor put his hand down her pants, touching
her genitals, skin to skin. CR137:86-87. J.E. pushed Noor away, grabbed her
keys, and tried to leave her apartment. CR137:87.
At about this time, a police officer entered the hall. Id. He saw Noor
and J.E. standing in the doorway to J.E.'s apartment. CR137:118. Noor was
"obstructing" J.E.'s "ability to leave." CR137:119. The officer saw that J.E.
was already "tearing up" and that she "appeared scared." CR137:12O. Her
clothing "was all out of place," and had "been pulled and stretched,
especially around the neck and the waist area." Id. The officer also noted
that Noor's belt was unbuckled and his pants completely unzipped.
CR137:123. Davis smelled a "strong odor" of alcohol on Noor. CR137:120.

When other officers arrived, Noor went to his apartment. CR137:121. He
"started yelling" profanities at them when they asked him to sit down. Id.

B. Procedural history.
The State charged Noor with one count of burglary, one count of
forcible sexual abuse, and one count of lewdness. CRl-3.
At an early hearing where a no-contact order was made, Noor had the
assistance of court-appointed Somali interpreter Abdullehi Kulmye. PCR415.
At the preliminary hearing, Noor had the assistance of court-appointed
Somali interpreter Ahmed M. Ali. PCR416-17. The victim, J.E., testified at

-5-
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that hearing.

Id.

At a subsequent arraignment hearing, Noor had the

assistance of yet another court-appointed Somali interpreter, Layla Ismail.
PCR416.
Noor attended at least five more pretrial hearings where he had the
assistance of an interpreter.

See generally PCR418-27 (Noor assisted by

interpreters Salah Awad, Ahmed M. Ali, Layla Ismail, and Ali Mohamed at
various proceedings).
Noor was tried before a jury in January 2011. R92-93. He had two
alternating Somali interpreters during trial. CR137:58-59; see PCR428 (listing
Ali Omar Ali as the interpreter). Michael Sikora represented Noor. Id.
Before voir dire of the jury venire, Sikora informed the Court that Noor
was with him at the defense table "with the interpreter." CR137:1. In his
opening argument, Sikora informed the jury that Noor was "sitting next to a
Somalia interpreter." CR137:58. Sikora said, "That is his native language,
and you will see this interpreter trade places off and on with the interpreter
who was here for the beginning." CR137:58-59. Sikora told this to the jury
"in case" they were "wondering what's going on when" the interpreters
"trade off as the trial goes along." CR137:59. Sikora went on to explain that
Noor spent twelve years of his life in Somalia and then seventeen more in
refugee camps in Kenya. CR137:59-60.

-6-
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At trial, the State called two witnesses- J.E. and the arresting officer.

See generally CR137. J.E. testified that she had been the resident manager at
the Lorna Doane apartment complex in Salt Lake City when Noor entered
her apartment uninvited, exposed his erect penis, and sexually assualted her.
CR137:61,71-87.
At one point during J.E.'s testimony, she identified Noor as "sitting
right there next to the interpreter in blue and khaki." CR137:66 (emphasis
added). J.E. testified that Noor had resided in the apartment across the hall
from her. CR137:67. The State presented photographs showing the relative
locations of Noor's and J.E.'s apartments with their door numbers. CR137:6768; State's Exhibits (SE) 2,3,4.
J.E. had "many" interactions with Noor; some involved Noor paying
rent, while others involved occasions in which she had to ask hhn to be quiet.
CR137:69. J.E. usually conversed with Noor in English, but she used the
assistance of Noor's brother as an interpreter on some occasions. CR137:6970.

J.E. went on to describe the night when Noor forcibly entered her
apartment, pointed to his erect penis and told her he loved her, and then
continued through the series of confrontations in which she verbally and
even physically resisted Noor' s sexual assaults. CR137:71-87.

-7-
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After J.E.'s testimony, the court dis1nissed the jury and asked Sikora if
Noor was going to testify.

CR137:112.

Sikora said that he "had that

. discussion with [Noor] this morning" and told him that he had a right to
testify. Id. Sikora continued, "It was my advice to him that he not testify and
he told me that he will h·ust me on this decision and agreed not to testify
today." Id.
The trial court then addressed Noor: "Is that correct, Mr. Noor? You
are going to take your attorney's advice and not testify today?" Id. Noor
responded, "Oh, okay. Yes." Id.
The arresting officer then testified that he saw Noor preventing a
disheveled, scared, and tearful J.E. from leaving her apartment. CR137:11819. Noor was drunk and verbally abusive towards officers until they arrested
hhn. CR137:120-21.
After the jury retired, Sikora made a perfunctory motion for a directed
verdict, and the court denied it. CR137:165. The jury returned with a guilty
verdict on all counts only twenty-seven minutes after being excused. R93.
The h·ial court sentenced Noor to concurrent 1-to-15-year prison terms
for burglary and forcible sexual abuse, and ordered credit for time served on
his lewdness conviction. PCR435-36.

-8-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Noor appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. On appeal, Noor was
represented by Sikora and Brittany- Em1iss from LDA. State v. Noor, 2012 UT
App 187,283 P.3d 543. He argued that since "subjugation and domination of
women is acceptable and even encouraged in the highly patriarchal Somali
culture," his conduct towards the victim "should be viewed only as a
misguided attempt to express love and affection," not as demonstrating an
intent to commit forcible abuse or sodomy. Id. ,I 6.
The court of appeals affirmed Noor' s convictions. Id. ,I 8. It held that
Noor had not preserved his cultural-misunderstanding claims, along with
other sufficiency of the evidence claims, because his 1notion for directed
verdict at trial lacked the requisite specificity. Id. ,I 7.
On Octa ber 17, 2012, this Court denied Noor' s petition for certiorari
review. State v. Noor, 288 P.3d 1045 (Utah 2012).
On November 5, 2013, Noor filed a timely pro se petition for postconviction relief.

He raised essentially two grounds for relief based on

theories of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. See generally PCRl-25
(Addendum B).
Noor claimed that Sikora ineffectively omitted certain arguments from
his motion for directed verdict. PCR6-7. Namely, Noor complained that
Sikora did not argue that Noor' s cultural background and intoxication

-9-
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prevented him from forming the requisite intent, and did not argue that no
"skin to skin contact with the victim's genitals" occurred. PCR7. Noor also
faulted Sikora for not objecting to a forcible sexual abuse jury instruction on
grounds that it hnproperly listed the knowing, intentional, and reckless
mental states. PCR8-9.
Noor used a standard form available to aid prisoners in filing their
post-conviction petitions.

In the section designated for naming and

articulating grounds for relief, the form insh·ucted: "NOTICE TO THE
PETITIONER: You may be barred from presenting additional grounds in a

future post-conviction petition if you fail to present any grounds that you
could present here but do not." PCRS (holding and capitalization in original).
On the same page, the form instructed in boldface that Noor "must allege
facts" in support of any ground raised. Id.

With his petition, Noor filed a motion for appointment of counsel,
which the court denied.

PCR26-27,40-41.

The State filed a motion for

summary judgment on Noor's petition. PCR57-91. Meanwhile, Noor filed
letters with the court stating that he could not read or write English and that
another person was writing pleadings on his behalf. PCR101,104.
Accepting these representations, the district court ordered that counsel
be appointed for Noor. PCR107-09 (Addendum C). Attorneys from Holland

-10-
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~·

& Hart entered their appearance in October 2014. PCR113-14,117-18. Due to

a conflict, they soon withdrew. PCR128-30,143.
In March 2015, Noor' s current counsel from Snow Christensen &
Martineau accepted appointment.

PCR153-54.

At a status conference,

counsel stated their intent to file an amended petition on Noor's behalf.
PCR160 (Addendum D). The State did not object, and the district court gave
Noor forty-five days to file an amended petition. Id.
At no point during Noor's preliminary hearing, arraignment, several
pretrial conferences, trial, presentence investigation, appeal, original postconviction petition, or in the various representations he made pro se or
through counsel up to the filing of his amended petition had Noor
suggested- let alone claimed- that he did not understand the victim's
testimony or that his court-appointed trial interpreters were incompetent.
Neither had Noor complained about any of Sikora' s pretrial decisions.
Noor, through counsel, filed an amended petition and memorandum
in support on August 27, 2015. PCR185-210 (Addendum E). It omitted all of
the challenges Noor set forth in the original petition. For the first time in over
four years of litigation, Noor claimed that he "had a difficult time
understanding the translation" of his Somali interpreter during his jury trial.
PCR203.

Despite the record evidence showing that Noor had at least 5

-11-
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different court-appointed Somali interpreters alternately assisting him
during his preliminary hearing, arraignment, and subsequent pretrial
hearings, as well as two interpreters during trial, Noor claimed that he "did
not even understand the accuser's testimony against him."

PCR201,203-

04,205.

Noor brought his amended collateral challenge under new theories of
sh·uctural error and ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he claimed that
Sikora' s facilitation of court interpreters at trial amounted to sh·uctural error
relieving Noor of his burden to prove prejudice. PCR203-04. He alleged that
Sikora" did not do anything" when Noor said that he was having difficulty
understanding the Somali interpreter's translation. Id. Second, he clai1ned,
in the alternative, that Sikora' s omission was ineffective under Strickland v.
Washington, and that he suffered prejudice because he did not understand the
victim's testimony and thus could not suggest to Sikora an alternative
defense theory that the victim was fabricating her testimony out of romantic
jealousy. PCR205-06. Third, Noor argued that Sikora was ineffective because
he did not allow him to "tell his version of what happened" when they met
before trial. PCR206-07. Finally, Noor claimed that Sikora was ineffective for
not advising him of deportation risks before they tried the case to a jury.
PCR209-10.

-12-
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The district court granted summary judgment for the State. PCR87982 (Addendum F). It ruled that all of Noor' s claims in the amended petition
were time barred because he raised them outside the PCRA' s one-year statute
of limitations and they did not relate back to any claims raised in his original,
timely petition. PCR880-82. The court determined that Noor had omitted all
of his original claims for relief and raised new claims with different core facts
in their stead. Id.
The district court rejected Noor' s argument that it should deem his
claims timely because it had already allowed him to amend his petition
during an earlier status conference hearing. PCR881. The court concluded
that it was not given the opportunity to address the statute of limitations on
Noor's claims at that hearing. Id. Noor's counsel had said only that they
wanted "to try and put some substance" to the original petition and needed
time to "ascertain whether there [were] any other issues that needed to be
raised." Id. The statute of limitations issues was thus "not before the court"
when it granted the motion to amend. Id.
The court further concluded that it did not have authority to extend the
liinitations period at the time of the status conference, even if Noor had
apprised the Court of the timeliness of his claims. Id. The court observed that
the Legislature had" sharply restricted" district courts' discretion to consider

-13- J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

untimely post-conviction petitions. Id. (citing Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46,

,r

91, 234 P.3d 1115). The court concluded that its earlier decision to allow
Noor' s amended petition did not mean it had the authority to extend a
limitations period established by statute. Id.
The court next rejected Noor's argument under rule 15(c), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, that his amended petition's claims related back to those
in his original pro se petition. PCR881-82. Following the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in Mayle v. Felix, the court determined that" even
the most liberal reading" of Noor' s original and amended petitions could not
sustain an inference that their claims were related by a common core of facts.

Id. (citing 545 U.S. 644,664 (2005)). Noor's original petition made no mention
of alleged problems with his trial interpreter, with his counsel during pretrial
meetings, or with counsel's alleged failure to inform him of deportation
consequences. Id. The only mention Noor' s original petition made of his
difficulty with the English language concerned his ability to understand the
victim and thus form the requisite intent for his underlying crimes. Id. But
that claim did not fault his trial interpreter, and was thus based on different
operative facts than the interpreter-deficiency claims in his amended petition.

Id. The district court thus concluded that all of the amended petition's claims
were time barred. Id.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court correctly granted summary judgment for the State.
Noor brought his amended petition over a year and a half after the PCRA' s
statute of limitations elapsed on Noor's amended claims. And the amended
petition completely abandoned the claims in his original petition, instead
substituting claims that shared no common factual core with any claim in the
original.

Because the rule governing amendments in post-conviction

proceedings is silent on the issue whether untimely amendments must relate
back to claims in a timely petition, the district court properly looked to rule
15(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs pleading amendments,
to fill the gap. That rule required that Noor' s amendments arise from the
same conduct, occurrence, or transaction in claims set forth in his original,
timely petition. None of the claims in Noor' s amended petition met rule
15(c)'s relation back requirement. They were thus time barred as a matter of
law.
ARGUMENT

I.
The district court correctly ruled that Noor' s amended petition,
whose core pleaded facts differed from and at times
contradicted those in his original petition, was time barred.

Noor argues that rules governing post-conviction amendments and
this Court's precedent gave the district court" discretion" to review the merits

-15-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of claims raised in his amended petition, regardless of their timeliness.
Br.Aplt. 10-19. He views the district court's application of the PCRA's time
bar to those claims as an abuse of that discretion. Id. But the district court
correctly determined that its general discretion to permit or deny
amendments did not give it authority to extend the Legislature's one-year
limitations period for post-conviction claims. Because Noor' s new claims
came well over a year after the statute expired and shared no common core
of facts with those pleaded in his original timely petition, the district court
properly granted summary judgment against Noor.
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a district court to grant
summary judgment if "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact"
and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and other
documents before the court establish that there is no basis for awarding the
relief sought by a litigant." Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah
1981).
"The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate the time, trouble,
and expense of trial when it is clear as a matter of law that the party ruled
against is not entitled to prevail." Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates,
635 P .2d 53, 54 (Utah 1981). N oar bore the burden to show that his claims
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complied with the PCRA' s statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B9-105(2) (providing that once the State raises the procedural bar, "the
petitioner has the burden to disprove its existence by a preponderance of the
evidence").
To support summary judgment, the State had to show that Noor's
proffer, even if believed, failed as a matter of law to entitle him to relief. See

Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry, 2012 UT 39, if,f26-27, 284 P.3d 630 (agreeing
with a determination that the plaintiff's allegations were insufficient as a
matter of law to meet its burden on an element of its claim).
The district court properly granted summary judgment. All of Noor' s
claims were time barred because he raised them outside the PCRA' s statute
of limitations and they did not arise from the same conduct, occurrence, or
transaction in claims set forth in his original timely petition.
Under the PCRA, a "petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-9-107.

The PCRA requires post-conviction courts to "clearly and

expressly determine whether [a] claim is independently precluded" by the
time bar, even "if the court comments on the merits of a post-conviction
claim." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b). Noor's cause of action accrued on January 15,
2013, the last day for seeking certiorari review in the United States Supreme
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Court. Id. § 78B-9-107(c)3; Supreme Court Rule 13 (Time for Petitioning).
Thus, Noor had to file his claims on or before January 15, 2014.
Noor filed his first post-conviction petition on November 5, 2013within the statute of limitations. But he did not file his current amended
petition until August 27, 2015. Thus, the claims in Noor's amended petition
were untimely unless he could prove that they related back to claims in his
original petition. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(2) (placing burden on
petitioner to" disprove" application of the time bar once raised by the State).
A. To be timely, amended claims must relate back to a common
core of operative facts raised in a timely petition.

The relation back doch·ine allows claims in amended pleadings to
survive the applicable statute of liinitations so long as they arise from the
same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out. .. in the original pleading."
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2). If a claim in an amended pleading does not relate
back to a claim raised in a timely pleading, then the timely pleading does not
serve to bring it within the statutory period. See Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d
1127, 1128-29 (Utah 1990).

The statute lists other potential times a cause of action can accrue,
such as discovery of new, material evidence, but Noor's petition did not
implicate any of them. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107. He does not argue
otherwise.
3
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"Proceedings" conducted under the PCRA are "civil and are governed
by the rules of civil procedure." Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-102. Provisions "for
filing and commencement of a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure." Id. Thus, when rule 65C does not specifically address a
procedural issue, the remainder of the rules of civil procedure govern. See,

e.g., Gordon v. State, 2016 UT 11, ,I 39 & n.17, 369 P.3d 1255 (interpreting rule
65C as impliedly incorporating general pleading rules that are not expressly
contrary to it).
Rule 65C expressly governs amended petitions brought under the
PCRA. It states, "No ... amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the
court." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(k). Rule 65C is silent, however, on whether new
claims are time barred when raised in an amended petition that falls outside
the PCRA's statute of limitations. Thus, by operation of the plain language
of the PCRA, a post-conviction court must look to other Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to resolve this question. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102; Gordon,
2016 UT 11, ,I 39 & n.17; see also Corcoran v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (Ind.
2006) (applying rule of evidence equivalent to Utah· rule 15(c) where Indiana
rules governing post-conviction relief were otherwise silent on how to treat
new claims brought in amended petition outside the statute of limitations).
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The only relevant provision to resolve this question is rule 15(c). Noor
thus misses the point when he reads the absence of a relation back
requirement m rule 65C(h)(3) & (k) as meaning that there is no such
require1nent for untimely amendments in post-conviction proceedings.
Br.Aplt. 10-11. As discussed, rule 15(c) fills this gap to permit amendments
that arise out of the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in
the original pleading."
The relationship between rules 65C(k) and 15(c) is similar to the
relationship between rules 15(a) and 15(c). Rule 15(a) governs how nonPCRA pleadings may be amended, such as by leave of the court. But it does
not address how untimely claims in an amendment are to be treated. Rule
15(c) does that work.
Likewise, rule 65C governs how to amend a post-conviction petitiononly by leave of the court. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(k). Like rule 15(a), rule 65C(k)
is silent on amendments that include otherwise untimely claims. Thus, the
district court must look to rule 15(c), just as it would in other civil cases.
Utah courts have not yet addressed the relation back doch·ine in the
context of post-conviction relief. But the United States Supreme Court has
applied the relation back doch·ine under federal civil procedure rules in
analogous federal habeas corpus proceedings. In Mayle v. Felix, the Court
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held that relation back of a claim will not occur and the claim will be untimely
unless the original and amended claims are "tied to a common core of
operative facts." 545 U.S. at 664 (providing survey of federal court rulings on
relation back in the context of amended habeas corpus petitions).
The petitioner in Mayle filed a timely prose federal habeas petition. Id.
at 648.

He claimed, among others, that the trial court's admission of a

witness's videotaped interview violated his right to confrontation under the
Sixth Amendment. Id. at 648. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA) imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal
habeas corpus petitioners. Id.

Five months after the AEDP A's one-year

limitation period expired, and eight months after the federal court appointed
him counsel, the petitioner filed an amended petition. Id. There, he added a
new claim: that officers violated his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination by using coercive tactics to obtain damaging statements from
him. Id.
The Court looked to the interaction between rule 15(c), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and the AEDP A's one-year limitation period, to conclude
that the petitioner's Fifth Amendment claim was time barred. Id. at 656-57,
664. Only two circuits had previously held that "conduct, transaction, or

occurrence" could encompass the entire trial, including conviction and
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sentence. Id. The majority of circuits interpreted "conduct, transaction, or
occurrence" more resh·ictively. Id. at 657.
The Supreme Court adopted the more restrictive reading because
interpreting "conduct, transaction, or occurrence [broadly] to mean same
trial, conviction, or sentence .. .leaves Rule 15(c)(2) meaningless in the habeas
context." Id. at 664 (citations and quotations omitted). The Court reasoned
that "amendments ... would almost invariably be allowed even after the
statute of limitations had expired, because most habeas claims arise from a
criminal defendant's underlying conviction and sentence."

Id. at 662

(citations omitted). Thus, Mayle held that relation back is proper only when
"the original and amended petitions state claims that are tied to a common
core of operative facts." Id. at 664. The petitioner's claims did not meet that
criterion. Id.
In the Court's view, the heightened pleading burden in federal habeas
corpus proceedings further militated towards a restrictive view of conduct,
transaction, or occurrence. Id. at 655, 661. The Court observed that that
burden is "more demanding" than the notice-pleading requirement imposed
on run-of-the-mine civil complaints because it requires petitioners to
'" specify all [available] grounds for relief"' in the federal petition and to
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'"state the facts supporting each ground."' Id. at 655, 661 (quoting Rule 2(c),
Rules Governing Section 2254 and 2255 Cases).

Mayle concerns not only a federal statutory proceeding directly
analogous to the PCRA, but also a federal rule of civil procedure upon which
Utah modeled its relation back rule and a similarly demanding pleading
requirement.

"Interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are

persuasive where the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar
to the federal rules." Tucker v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54,

,r 7

n.2, 53 P.3d 947 (internal citations omitted). And the Tenth Circuit has opined
that "Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) are substantially similar";
"both rules ask the same questions and lead to the same result." Dale K. Barker

Co., P.C. v. Valley Plaza, 541 F. App'x 810, 813-14 (10th Cir. 2013)
(unpublished). Thus, Mayle' s interpretation of federal rule 15(c) should guide
interpretation of Utah rule 15(c).

Mayle supports a narrow application of the relation back doctrine to
amended petitions brought under Utah's PCRA for at least three reasons.
First, 28 U.S.C. § 2242- like the PCRA- specifically applies the rules of
civil procedure to habeas corpus proceedings, and therefore operates in
precisely the same way in habeas proceedings that state rule 15(c) should in
PCRA cases.
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Second, federal and state interests in prompt resolution of criminal
proceedings manifestly align in their respective post-conviction statutes. As
II

Mayle recognized, the conduct, transaction or occurrence" in the context of
habeas corpus should be viewed narrowly because of the one-year statute of
limitations established by the AEDPA. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 653, 664. The
II

AEDP A was enacted to advance the finality of crilninal convictions," by
II

adopting the tight time line" of a one year statute of limitations. Id. at 662.
Similarly, Utah's Legislature expressed an intent in enacting the PCRA and
its statute of limitations to "significantly shorten[] the time and the number
of the appeals," available to criminal defendants. House Floor Debate, H.B.
214, 1996 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 22, 1996) (statement of Rep. John L. Valentine).
Indeed, the legislature intended that the PCRA be a "mirror image" of the
AEDPA. Id., see also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C advisory committee note (procedure
governing summary dis1nissal of frivolous claims in state post-conviction "is
patterned after the federal practice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254"). The PCRA
thus favors heightened scrutiny of amended petitions to eliminate the time
and expense of litigating new claims with different core facts.
Third, the rules governing federal habeas petitions contain a
"particularity-in pleading requirement" that substantively parallels the
PCRA' s pleading requirements. The federal rule requires a "petitioner to
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specify all the grounds for relief available to the petitioner and state the facts
supporting each ground."

Mayle, 545 U.S. at 655 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, each claim must be pleaded
"discretely" and the petitioner must provide facts "supporting the grounds
for relief" that "would delineate an occurrence" under rule lS(c). Id. at 661.
Likewise, a Utah post-conviction petitioner must "set forth all claims" and
include "all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief"
by attaching "affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of
the allegations." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C; see also McNair v. State, 2014 UT App
127,

,r 9, 328 P.3d 874 (stating PCRA provides" a somewhat higher standard

than the general" notice "pleading standard found in rule 8(a)").
This particularity requirement necessitates a narrow view of conduct,
transaction, or occurrence because each claim must stand alone. Viewing the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the entire pretrial, trial, and post-trial
case would "permit the relation back doctrine to swallow" the PRCA's statute
of limitations and the purposes behind rules lS(c) and 65C. Mayle, 545 U.S.
at 662. A petitioner could conceivably file a post-conviction petition with
only one claim and then file endless amendments on the theory that they all
generally relate back to "preh·ial, h·ial, or post-trial" error that provided a
"basis for challenging the conviction." Id. at 661. Such a strategy violates the
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PCRA's express purpose to prohibit interminable successive petitions. Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-106, -107; Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25,

ilif 25, 31, 285 P.3d

1133 (interpreting PCRA as consistent with the AEDP A in creating a
"prohibition against subsequent postconviction petitions"). The Legislature
could not have intended, in creating the one-year statute of limitations and a
bar against successive petitions, to allow for interminable amendments that
skirt the procedural bars and whose only limitation is the district court's
discretion over pleading amendments.
In applying the Mayle standard, federal courts routinely bar amended
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that share no core of operative facts
with previous ineffectiveness claims. See United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235
F.3d 501, 504-05 (10th Cir. 2000) (petitioner's ineffectiveness claims raised in
an amended petition did not relate back to the ineffectiveness claims in the
original petition because they were "totally separate and distinct, in both time
and type") (internal citations omitted); United States v. Edwards, 588 F. App'x
823, 827 (10th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (amendment with claim that attorney
failed to call petitioner as a wih1ess did not relate back to original petition
that attorney failed to call material witnesses); Turner v. United States, 699 F.3d
578, 583, 585 (1st Cir. 2012) (petitioner's ineffectiveness claim did not relate
back to original petition which had at least five other ineffectiveness claims);
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United States v. Pursley, No. 03-CR-00415, 2009 WL 1505164, at *2 (D. Colo.
May 28, 2009) ("Because Defendant's proposed new claims involve distinct
areas of alleged ineffective assistance ... [they] do not relate back for purposes
of amendment").
The majority of other state courts addressing the timeliness of
amended post-conviction claims require that the claims relate back to timely
ones in a narrower sense than simply relating to trial. See Roach v. Kentucky,
384 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Ky. 2012) (because of gap in state criminal rule
governing post-conviction, court looked to state civil rule governing
amendment-consistent with the Mayle approach-and held that untimely
amended claims 1nust arise" out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth .. .in the original pleading"); Thompson v. State, No. A-8043, 2003 WL
22405385, at *10 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2003) (unpublished) (applying
Alaska's civil rule 15(c)'s relation back doch ine to affirm the time bar on new
4

amended post-conviction claims); People v. Bell, 16 N.E. 3d 910, 914 (Ill. Ct.
App. 2014) (declining to review untimely amended claims that did not relate
back to original prose petition, because allowing the new claims would create
"an end run" around the district court's frivolousness review); Surinach v.

State, 110 So.3d 95, 95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (requiring relation back of
untimely amended claims, but allowing untimely claims that "merely enlarge
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an issue or issues raised in the original motion"); Johnson v. State, No. CR 031023, 2005 WL 3320855, at *4 (Ark. Dec. 8, 2005) (unpublished) (requiring that
all grounds for relief be raised in original post-conviction petition); Jones v.

State, No. 01-0184, 2002 WL 100566, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002) (per
curiam) (rejecting petitioner's argmnent that new ineffective assistance claim
related back to original pro se insufficiency of the evidence claim and
affirming time bar of the new claim). Respondent is aware of only one
jurisdiction that has rejected application of the relation back doctrine to bar
amended post-conviction claims raised outside the statute of limitations. See

Ex parte Jenkins, 972 So.2d 159, 162 (Ala. 2005).
In short, relation back of a claim will not occur and the claim will be
untimely unless the original and amended claims are "tied to a common core
of operative facts." Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664. A claim introducing additional
facts only relates back if it "clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory in the
original motion." United States v. Espinoza-Saenz, 235 F.3d 501, 504-05 (10th
Cir. 2000). An amendment does not relate back if it "seek[s] to add a new
claim or to insert a new theory into the case." Id.; see also United States v. Hicks,
283 F.3d 380,388 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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B. Utah's relation back case law supports a narrow reading of
11
conduct, transaction, or occurrence" in post-conviction
proceedings.

Utah courts have applied rule 15(c) narrowly to amended claims in
other civil contexts. For instance, in Yearsley v. Jensen, this Court determined
that new claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution varied
"profoundly" from claims of police assault and battery in the original
complaint. 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990). The original complaint alleged
only that officers "physically beat" the plaintiff and made not "even an
obscure reference" to other misconduct.

Id. at 1128-29.

Denial of the

amendment was thus proper. Id. at 1129.
And in Highlands at Jordenelle, LLC v. Washington Cty., the Utah Court
of Appeals barred an amended complaint brought by a company that had
purchased the right to sue from two landowners, one the successor in interest
to the other. 2015 UT App 173, ,Jif 47, 51-52, 355 P.3d 1047. The court held
that Washington County's fees charged against. the successor landowner
amounted to separate conduct than the fees charged against the predecessor,
even though both fees were assessed in a singular effort to build a fire station
by new housing developments along the Jordanelle Reservoir. Id. Thus, the
amended complaint did not relate back to the original and ran afoul of the
statute of limitations. Id. if if 51-52.
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Only when an amendment consists of new "legal characterization of
the same conduct" or clarifies an existing claim can relation back allow the
amendment to come under the statute. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675
P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983) (determining relation back of a widow plaintiff's
amend1nent that consisted solely of requesting punitive damages against a
hospital for misconduct that had already been specifically pleaded in the
original complaint); see also Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d
1350, 1353, 1359-60 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (determining that an amended
complaint related back to the original complaint because it merely clarified
that the breach of contract claim was targeted at a later agreement that
concerned the sale of the same automobile sales and service company).
The upshot of these cases is that Utah courts examine "conduct,
transaction, or occurrence" scrupulously in civil cases and bar untimely
amendments that allege "new or different acts of misconduct." Yearsley, 798
P.2d at 1129. The rule applies a fortiori in post-conviction cases, which are
governed by the rules of civil procedure and, unlike other civil cases, are
collateral attacks on presumptively valid convictions. Petitioners here have
already seen an underlying case to completion and that case has been
docmnented by a trial record and oftentimes an appellate record. Discovery
in post-conviction is often unnecessary because the record has already been
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sufficiently developed through the trial and appellate processes. What was
not developed through trial and appeal is often within the petitioner's own
exclusive and privileged possession, such as conversations with trial counsel.
These factors give rise to a presumption of regularity that simply does not
obtain in normal civil proceedings. See Lucero v. Kennard, 2005 UT 79,

if 24,

125 P.3d 917. Both the court and the State are entitled to repose where the
record is already sufficient to justify the conviction and sentence.
Noor nevertheless argues that this Court's post-conviction precedent
"strongly suggests" that relation back of claims should not be required for
amended post-conviction petitions.

Br.Aplt. 15-19.

But none of Noor's

authorities address a situation like his, where appointed counsel files an
amended petition with new facts unrelated to those pleaded in the original
pro se petition.

Benvenuto v. State, only undermines his argument. 2007 UT 53, 165 P.3d
1195. Benvenuto failed to file a timely pro se petition and argued that he
lacked resources in prison to adequately research his claims and could not
afford counsel in time to file a petition that met the limitations period. Id.

~

33. This Court rejected both justifications for the late filing and endorsed the
district court's ruling that Benvenuto failed to show that he could not have
filed a timely pro se petition or that his counsel could not have subsequently
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amended it '"pursuant to rule 15."' Id. ,I 34 (quoting the district court).

Benvenuto thus supports that amendments to post-conviction petitions must
comply with rule 15, including its relation back requirement.

Gregg v. State did not address the PCRA's statute of limitations and the
relation back requirement because neither party raised them. 2012 UT 32, 279
P.3d 396. Rather, the State argued that Gregg's petition was successive
because Davis County lacked authority to stipulate to Gregg amending a
petition that the district court had already dismissed. Id.

if ,I 14, 16; see Utah

Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(d) (barring claims that were raised, or could have
been but were not raised, in a previous post-conviction petition).
To the extent Gregg can be read as endorsing the filing of untimely
amend1nents that share no common core of facts with an original, timely
petition, it should be overruled. Its rejection of the State's argument that
Gregg's petition was successive did not create "weighty" precedent and had
"little analysis" and no "reference to authority." Menzies v. State, 889 P.2d
393,399 (Utah 1994). The Court cited no authority when it accepted Gregg's
petition despite Davis County's lack of authority to stipulate to its
amendment. Indeed, the decision contradicted the rules governing postconviction relief. "Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of a
[post-conviction] petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil
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Procedure." Utah Code Am1. § 78B-9-102(1); accord Utah R. Civ. Proc. 65C(a).
Under· rule 65C(i), when a post-conviction petition challenges "a felony
conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the

Attorney General."

(Emphasis added).

Gregg bypassed the lawful

representatives of the State and obtained an ex parte stipulation from a
prosecutor who lacked any authority to agree to the amendment.
Moreover, to the extent Gregg permitted an untimely petition whose
claims did not relate back, it proposes an unworkable rule. Menzies, 889 P.2d
at 400. As discussed, such a rule contravenes the Legislature's intent in
requiring post-conviction petitioners to bring all of their claims within one
year of the accrual date. Removing this restriction would allow petitioners
to file endless untimely amendments on the theory that they all generally
relate back to "pretrial, trial, or post-trial error" that provided "a basis for
challenging the conviction." Mayle, 545 U.S at 661.
Noor' s other cases supply only dic~a supporting the undisputed
principle that post-conviction courts have discretion to allow petitioners to
amend with new legal theories after the statute of limitations has expired.
None of them comes close to saying that the petitioner can amend with new
core facts outside the limitations period. See Pinder v. State, 2015 UT 56., ,I 61,
367 P.3d 968 (noting merely that in post-conviction, a "denial of a motion to
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amend usually requires explanation"); Gordon v. State, 2016 UT App 190,

,r

37, 382 P.3d 1063 (defaulting Gordon's ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel claim and noting his failure to amend his original petition with that
claim based on· the same underlying facts as an already-pleaded ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim).
C. Barring late claims that share no common core of facts with
those raised in a timely petition advances legislative policy.

Applying the statute of limitations to bar new claims with different
core facts advances the Legislature's prerogative in enacting the PCRA. The
PCRA' s one-year statute of limitations encourages diligence in the filing of
state post-conviction petitions and fosters repose, stability, and public faith
in the justice system by bringing finality to criminal convictions and state
judgments. See House Floor Debate, H.B. 214, 1996 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 22, 1996)
(statement of Rep. John L. Valentine).
Delayed claims come with deterioration or loss of evidence.

This

disserves both the parties and the reviewing court because it weakens the
fact-finding process.

The United States Supreme Court has stated that

discovery and trial are "obviously more reliable if the witness or testimony
in question is relatively fresh. Thus, in the judgment of most legislatures and
courts, there comes a point at which the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a claim
is sufficiently likely either to impair the accuracy of the fact-finding process
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or to upset settled expectations that a substantive claim will be barred
without respect to whether it is meritorious." Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478,487 (1980); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)

(asserting that statutes of limitation "protect defendants and the courts from
having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously
impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of
witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise").
Courts aim to minimize error in adjudication of claims. Enforcing the
statute of limitations ensures that the majority of post-conviction cases and
claims will be considered with fresh evidence and thus with greater accuracy.
This is h·ue regardless of whether issues of timeliness arise at the filing of the
original petition or an amended petition. Late claims threaten the integrity
of the judicial process.
Noor nevertheless argues that applying the relation back doctrine to
amended petitions filed by appointed counsel who take the case after the
statute of limitations has already expired will render counsel's appointment
"futile" and ultimately have a chilling effect on pro bona representation in
post-conviction cases. Br.Aplt. 13-14. Noor reasons that limiting appointed
counsel to the core of facts raised in a pro se litigant's original, timely petition
will work manifest injustice. Id. Citing Justice Souter' s dissent in Mayle, Noor
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continues that the Utah Legislature, in enacting the PCRA, could not have
intended to so limit pro bona counsel's assistance. Id. at 13.
But Noor identifies no non-speculative disadvantage to petitioners
who file timely pro se petitions then get the benefit of counsel to help
prosecute those petitions.

Rule 65C(d)(3) and the PCRA require that a

petitioner exercise reasonable diligence and plead" all of the facts that form
the basis of the petitioner's clahn to relief." Petitioners like Noor have one
year from the conclusion of their criminal case to gather trial documents,
review them, identify points of grievance, and plead all facts related to those
grievances. In Noor' s case, he would have been aware of any trial-interpreter
problems and other pretrial matters with Sikora as early as the trial itself.
Noor enlisted an English-writing individual's help in prison to file a timely
petition for post-conviction relief with claims already challenging Sikora's
effectiveness. That fact alone defeats his complaint that a language barrier
prevented him from identifying more pressing grievances. If they were
indeed more pressing, he should have exercised greater diligence in
presenting them within the limitations period.
And the PCRA provides flexibility for those litigants who, despite
reasonable diligence, cannot not timely bring their claims. Again, it gives
petitioners a full year to file from the accrual date. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
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107(1). While s01ne of its accrual dates look to fixed events, others postpone
accrual to account for later occurring events, such as new evidence or new
legal rules. Id. The statute also tolls the year for any time the petitioner is
unable to bring suit because of mental or physical disability, or because
unconstitutional state action prevents a petitioner from filing. Id. It also tolls
the year while a DNA or factual innocence petition is pending. Id. This
flexibility affords petitioners all the opportunity to present a claim that
fairness reasonably requires.
Applying the relation back doctrine in post-conviction does nothing to
erode these safe harbors. Noor' s case simply does not fit them. He has never
argued otherwise.

PCR881 n.2 (district court noting that Noor had not

argued a different limitations period applies or that the limitations period
was tolled for any reason).
Requiring that appointed counsel honor the PCRA's limitations period
when considering what claims to bring in an amended petition is consistent
with legislative intent and with the relation back rule.

Noor merely

speculates that this requirement would prevent petitioners from bringing
claims "most worthy of the PCRA court's consideration." Br.Aplt. 14. As
discussed, the PCRA already provides a flexible framework that allows pro
se litigants to plead all of the facts that form the basis of their grievances.
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Applying the relation back doctrine merely requires that appointed counsel
stick to those core facts. It does not prevent them from arguing those facts
under different legal theories. Behrens, 675 P.2d 1179 at 1182-83.
And Noor' s rule, seeking to protect the ability of appointed pro bono
counsel to bring new claims, finds no support in the PCRA itself. Utah code
section 78B-9-109(2) provides that a post-conviction court may appoint pro
bono counsel to assist an indigent inmate, but only if" the petition" "contains
factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing" or it "involves
complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for
proper adjudication."

This provision presupposes that the petition has

already pleaded facts or claims sufficient to require attorney assistance, and
that the attorney will litigate that petition.

It does not contemplate the

petitioner's alleged need to drum up new claims with counsel's help. Of
course, section -109 does not prohibit counsel amending the petition, but that
is beside the point. Section -109' s express preconditions for the appointment
of pro bono counsel do not support Noor's argument that the pleading rules
should accommodate counsel's late appointment.
Applying the relation back requirement to amended post-conviction
petitions thus does not work a "grave miscarriage of justice," as Noor sees it.
Br.Aplt. 14.

It is a necessary extension of the Legislature's intent and
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consistent with this Court's rules of civil procedure. It puts post-conviction
petitioners under the same burdens as other civil litigants.

D. Noor's amended claims did not relate back to any timely claims.
N oar's amended petition raised new claims that shared no common
core of operative facts with the claims raised in his original petition. Noor' s
original petition challenged only three of Sikora' s strategic trial decisions.
Noor faulted Sikora for not stressing during his directed verdict motion (1)
the effect of Noor' s intoxication on his mental state and (2) the lack of skinto-skin between Noor's fingers and the victim's vagina. PCR7. And Noor
faulted Sikora for (3) not objecting to the forcible sexual abuse elements
instruction. PCRS-9.
Nowhere in his original petition did Noor allege that his Somali
interpreters provided inadequate assistance, much less that Sikora was
ineffective for not ensuring that Noor had a more robust translation during
trial. Similarly, Noor at no point claimed that Sikora did not let him" tell his
version of what happened" when they met before trial. Indeed, none of
Noor' s original claims involved Sikora' s pretrial performance. Finally, Noor
never alleged that Sikora did not inform hitn of deportation risks before they
tried the case to a jury, much less that Sikora was ineffective in this regard.
Because his new claims did not arise from the same "conduct, transaction, or
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occurrence" underlying claims raised in his original petition, they did not
relate back and are time barred.
Noor concedes that the claims in his amended petition "differ from
those in his original petition." Br.Aplt. 23. He nevertheless argues that his
pro se petition should be construed liberally as raising core facts common to
those pleaded in his amended petition. Br.Aplt. 20-24. He says that his
original petition, at its core, concerned Sikora's inattention to Noor's "cultural
background and language ability" and Sikora' slack of communication. Id. at
22-23.
But the liberal pleading standard afforded to prose litigants does not
allow their later-appointed counsel to bypass civil rules and statutory timing
requirements. And even a liberal reading of Noor's petition does not yield
the similarities he purports to find between the original and the amend1nent.
Indeed, Noor's original and amended petitions are factually opposite. Noor's
original complaint was that Sikora should have argued that Noor' s language
barrier "impaired his ability to understand the victim's demands that he stop
his advances and leave her apartment."

PCR7 (emphasis added).

Noor's

amended petition stated that he was never in J.E.'s apartment. PCR198,201;
PCR572. The new claim involved an entirely different "conduct, transaction,

or occurrence" than the old. Indeed, it contradicted the original petition. In
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one core of facts, Noor was in the apartment; in the other, he was not. No
liberal reading of those pleaded versions can alchemize them into a single
common core of alleged facts.
Noor' s argument, both on direct appeal and in his original petition,
centered on a theme of cultural and linguistic 1nisunderstanding between
Noor and the victim, not Noor and counsel. On appeal, Noor argued that
"subjugation and domination of women is acceptable and even encouraged
in the highly patriarchal Somali culture," and that his conduct towards

J.E.

"should be viewed only as a misguided attempt to express love and
affection." Noor, 2012 UT App 187, ,I 6. In his prose post-conviction petition,
Noor faulted counsel for not better arguing that language and cultural
barriers prevented Noor "from forming the requisite intent to commit
lewdness or forcible abuse," and from "understanding the victim's demands
that he stop his advances and leave her apartment." 4 PCR7 (emphasis
added). The original claim related to Sikora' s trial sh·ategy in addressing the

Noor also argued in his original petition that Sikora should have
stressed during his directed verdict motion (1) the alleged effect of Noor' s
intoxication on his mental state and (2) alleged the lack of skin-to-skin contact
between Noor's fingers and the victim's vagina. PCR7. And Noor faulted
Sikora for not objecting to the forcible sexual abuse elements instruction.
PCRS-9. None of these clai~s implicated Noor's language barrier, let alone
Sikora' s facilitation of court-appointed Somali interpreters. They share no
cmnrnon core of operative facts with his new claims.
4
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elements of the offense. The amended claim abandoned any complaint about
Sikora' s strategic decisions at trial and instead focused on the relationship
between attorney and client and the language barriers between them.
Noor not only abandoned his core factual allegation that he was with
J.E. in her apartment; he conh·adicted himself by claiming he was never there.
He could not gin up a fact dispute by disagreeing with himself. Cf Webster

v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Utah 1983) (holding that that a "moving party may
not rely upon his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition .... "); see also

In re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation, 707 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the "sham issue of fact" doctrine prohibits a party from
defeating summary judgment "simply by submitting an affidavit that
contradicts the party's previous sworn testimony").
And nowhere in his pro se petition did Noor allege that his cultural
and language barriers prevented him from communicating with and
understanding Sikora, or from understanding what went on at trial. Yet that
was the sole focus of his amended petition. He never once mentioned the
Somali interpreters, much less alleged that they provided inadequate
interpretation at trial. Yet his amended petition claimed that he had no idea
what the victim was saying at trial. PCR572. The two petitions shared no
common "transaction" or "occurrence" other than the h·ial itself and Sikora' s
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representation. Noor's argument under the relation back doctrine "views
'occurrence' at too high a level of generality." Mayle, 545 U.S. at 661. But,
more fatally, it shows Noor abandoning a version of facts that no longer
suited him in effort to manufacture a fact dispute on entirely different facts
concerning Sikora' s performance.
E. The district court's allowance for an amendment of the petition
neither gave Noor license to raise untimely claims nor
prevented the State from raising procedural defenses.

Noor argues that the dish·ict court's application of the time bar to the
claims in his amended petition "backh·acked" on its earlier order allowing
him leave to amend before he had presented his amendments to the court.
Br.Aplt. 10. He says that the district court had "discretion" to allow his
amended petition to move past summary judgment, even if it raised "new
claims and even after the statute of limitations ha[d] expired." Id. at 11.
Noor' s argument wrongly presupposes that the district court's discretion to
allow an amended petition bound the court to overlook the timeliness of his
claims once he presented them.
Under Noor' s logic, a post-conviction petitioner could raise defaulted
or litigated-and-lost claims in an amended petition with impunity. Noor's
rule would allow a petitioner to withhold the nature of the amended claim
until being granted leave to amend, thus depriving the court of any
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opportunity to consider the new claim's timeliness. If it were h·ue that a postconviction court's silence on statutory limitations hypothetically applicable
to amended claims operated as a waiver of those limitations, Noor could
relitigate claims he raised at trial and on appeal, or litigate claims that he
could have, but did not raise on appeal. The PCRA' s procedural bars plainly
foreclose Noor's line of reasoning. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(b)
(barring claims that were raised at trial or on appeal); id. § 78B-9-106(1)(c)
(barring claims that could have been, but were not, raised at trial or on
appeal). The same must be true for new claims raised outside the statute of
limitations. Id. §§ 78B-9-106(1)(e), -107.
Noor has previously argued that the State waived its statute of
limitations defense by not objecting to post-conviction counsel's request for
leave to ainend at the April 2015 status conference hearing. PCRS31-32. To
the extent he maintains that position here, the argument is misguided. The
II

PCRA allows both the State and the reviewing court to raise the time bar at
any time" -including on appeal from an order granting post-conviction
relief- unless the court determines that it should have been raised earlier.
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-106(2)(a). The statute makes no distinction between
claims in an original petition and claims in an amendment. And the rule
governing post-conviction procedure required that the district court, before
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commenting on the merits of a post-conviction claim, "first clearly and
expressly determine whether that claim [was] independently precluded"
under the PCRA's procedural and time bars. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b).
The State asserted the time bar at the earliest possible opportunity: after
Noor raised untimely claims in his amended petition. Neither the court nor
the State could determine at the April 2015 hearing whether procedural bars
applied to Noor' s amended claims because he had not yet pleaded them. This
speaks to a basic principle of civil pleading: affirmative defenses, including
statute of limitations, can only be raised after a plaintiff makes a claim for
relief. Utah R. Civ. P. 8 (c) ("In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively ... statute of limitations" as an affirmative defense.)
(emphasis added). Parties do not anticipa torily plead defenses to unpleaded
claims.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-106 (2017) Preclusion of Relief - Exception

(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief
or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for postconviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107.
(2) (a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time,
including during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction
relief, unless the court determines that the state should have raised the time
bar or procedural bar at an earlier time.
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion,
provided that it gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address
the exception set forth in Subsection (3).
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Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-107 (2017) Statute of limitations for
postconviction relief

(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year
after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the
following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over
the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari
is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of
the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of
certiorari is filed;
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is
established.
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner
was prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United
States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity. The petitioner has
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is
entitled to relief under this Subsection (3).
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a
petition asserting:
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303; or
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401.
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations
period established in this section.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 15 Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
(a) Amendments before trial.
(1) A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it; or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21
days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a
motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the court's
permission or the opposing party's written consent. The party must attach its
proposed amended pleading to the motion to permit an amended pleading.
The court should freely give permission when justice requires.
(3) Any required response to an amended pleading must be filed within the
time remaining to respond to the original pleading or within 14 days after
service of the amended pleading, whichever is later.
(b) Amendments during and after trial.
(1) When an issue not raised in the pleadings is tried by the parties' express or
implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings.
A party may move--at any time, even after judgment-- to amend the
pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue.
But failure to amend does not affect the result of the h·ial of that issue.
(2) If, at trial, a party objects that evidence is not within the issues raised in the
pleadings, the court may permit the pleadings to be amended. The court
should freely permit an amendment when doing so will aid in presenting the
merits and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the evidence
would prejudice that party's action or defense on the merits. The court may
grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet the evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. An amendment to a pleading relates back to
the date of the original pleading when:
(1) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation
back;
(2) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original
pleading; or
(3) the amendment adds a party, substitutes a party, or changes the name of
the party against whom a claim is asserted, if paragraph (c)(2) is satisfied and
if, within the period provided by Rule 4(b) for serving the summons and
complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
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(A) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits; and
(B) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.

(d) Supplemental pleadings. On motion and reasonable notice, the court may,
on just terms, permit a party to file a supplemental pleading setting out any
transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to
be supplemented. The court may permit supplementation even though the
original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense. The court may order
that the opposing party respond to the supplemental pleading within a specified
time.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 65C Post-conviction relief.

(a) Scope. This rule governs proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief
filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9.
The Act sets forth the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the
legality of a criminal conviction and sentence after the conviction and sentence
have been affirmed in a direct appeal under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, or the time to file such an appeal has expired.
(b) Procedural defenses and merits review. Except as provided in paragraph (h),
if the court comments on the merits of a post-conviction claim, it shall first
clearly and expressly determine whether that claim is independently precluded
under Section 78B-9-106.
(c) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of
conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is
filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(d) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. The petition
shall state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced
and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together
with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the
petitioner;
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the
petitioner's claim to relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number
and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the
results of the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results
of the prior proceeding; and
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(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in
time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous
post-conviction petition.
(e) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall
attach to the petition:
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the
allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction
or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or
sentence; and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(f) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.

(g) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and
deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced
the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.
(h) (1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated
in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its
face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating
either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its
face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the
claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of
dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(2) A claim is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claim has no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the claim challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired
prior to the filing of the petition.
(3) If a claim is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error
or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a
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copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant
one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(h)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial postconviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(i) Service ·of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all
or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall
designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk
to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the
respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.

G) Appointment of pro bono counsel. If any portion of the petition is not
summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent petitioner,
appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the
post conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. In determining whether to
appoint counsel the court shall consider whether the petition or the appeal
contains factual allegations that will require an evidentiary hearing and whether
the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance
of counsel for proper adjudication.
(k) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that
have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the
petitioner in accordance with Rule S(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further
pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.

(1) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
umeasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
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(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be
presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(m) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the
prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where
the petitioner is confined.
(n) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by
the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to
believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely
to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the
petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records.

(o) Orders; stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be
stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written
notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter
the stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will
be taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to
arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that
may be necessary and proper.
(p) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the
court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted
the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections,
Utah Code Title 78A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner and procedure by
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which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and
costs.
(q) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah
in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
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Osman Mohammed Noor
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634
Attorney Pro Se

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

* PETITION FOR RELIEF UNDER
Osman Mohammed Noor
Petitioner,

*
*
*
*

~\W\f vs.

THE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
ACT
UCA 78B-9-101 -405 et seq.

*

URCP Rule 65C

:

Case No.:

*
The State of Utah
Respondent.

I.

*
*

r7JlP1 Dl0W

JUDGE- - - - - - - -

NAME OF RESPONDENT:

_x_Conviction of Felony:
Conviction of Misdemeanor:
Conviction of Misdemeanor:

State of Utah
County of
Municipality of:

II.

IDENTIFICATION OF CURRENT AND RELATED CASES

1

(a)
(b)
(c)

2.
3.
4.

Name of court that entered the judgment being challenged: THIRD District Court
Location of Court: 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Case Number:....;;.0__9__
19..,. .; ;0___52~1"--"l"""""F.. ;.; S;. . ._. ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Date of Judgment being challenged:_ _"""""'Jan~uary
__4......
, 2_0_1_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Sentence: Two one to fifteen year sentences, to be served concurrently.
Nature of offense involved (all counts) Burglary, 2nd Degree Felony; Forcible Sexual
Abuse, 2nd Degree Felony; Lewdness-first or second offense, Class B Misdemeanor.

REV: 09/2011
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5.

What was your plea?
X Not Guilty
__Guilty
__No Contest
__Guilty and Mentally ill
__Not Guilty by reason of insanity

6.

7.

If you entered a plea of guilty to- some counts, and a not guilty plea to other counts, give
your plea to each count: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

If you pled not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity, was the trial before?
X

8.

__Judge

Jury

Did you testify at the trial?
Yes

9.

X

No

_Not Applicable

Did you appeal from the conviction or Sentence?
X

10.

_Not Applicable

No

Yes

_Not Applicable

If your answer is "Yes" provide the following information:
A. Naine of Appellate Court:_____U__tah=--C---"o:.. ;;urt=-:;.. ;__
of__A~P...P--'eal=---s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case Number: 20110198-CA
__mn
__
ed_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Result: __C__o__n_v_ic_ti_o__n_A_ffi
Date of result or citation of opinion: _Ja...;u...,ly~l2=-•i. . ;a2;. ,aa0.. ; ;.1=-2_ _ _ _ _ _ __
Grounds raised: State's failure to present sufficient evidence that Defendant had
the requisite intent to commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse, or burglary
premised on either of those offenses.

-

Did you seek further review of this appeal?_ _ _ _ _ _ __

REV: 09/2011
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X Yes

_Not Applicable

- -No

If your answer is "Yes" provide the following information:

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

~

VP

11.
~

Name of Reviewing Court:_--'U'"""'t"'"""ah~Su"'""p"""'"r-"-'em~e"""'"C__o_urt
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case Number: _ _ _
20_1_2_06_7_6-~S_C_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Result:
Petition for Writ of Certiorari denied.
Date of result or citation of opinion:_O
___c__t__
ob__e__r__1___7....., 2_0__1___2__. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Grounds raised: Utah Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that defense
counsel had not preserved a claim that the state presented insufficient evidence as
to intent even though defense counsel made a motion for directed verdict during
trial.

If you did not appeal from your conviction or sentenced, why not?

Petitioner's attorney failed to inform the petitioner that the next step in the appeal process
was to file a Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court.
12.

(a) Other than your direct appeal from your conviction or Sentence, have you filed any
petitions, applications, or motions with respect to this conviction or sentence in any court,
state of federal?
_Yes

X

No

_Not Applicable

(b). If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Nameofcourt: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Result: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date of result citation of opinion: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Grounds Raised: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

c). Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application, or motion?
REV: 09/2011

[3]
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x_Yes

_ _No

_Not Applicable

(d) Did you appeal the decision on your petition, application or motion?

¾-Yes

_ _No

_Not Applicable

(e) If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
13.

Nameofcourt:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Result:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date of result citation of opinion: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Grounds Raised: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(a)
Other than the case described in question 12, have you filed any further petitions,
applications, or motions with respect to this conviction or sentence in any court,
state of federal?
_Yes

(b)

X

No

_Not Applicable

If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Nameofcourt: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Case Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Result:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Date of result citation of opinion:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Grounds Raised:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application, or motion?
_±_Yes
(d)

_Not Applicable

Did you appeal the decision on your petition, application or motion?
~Yes

(e)

_No

_No

_Not Applicable

If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information:
(1) Name of court:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(2) Case Number:. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

[4]
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(3) Result: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(4) Date of result citation of opinion: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(5) Grounds: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
14. (a)
Do you have any petition, appeal, or motion now pending in any court, state
or federal, relating to the judgment being challenged:

X
(b)

Yes

_No

_Not Applicable

If your answer is "Yes", provide the following information:
(1) Name of court: United States District Court, District of Utah Central Division
(2) Case Number:--=-2.;;..;;;;.:1=-3-. . ; .c. ;. .v-. . ; .0. ; . .07;;. .; ;.3. . ; .8_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(3) Nature of Proceeding:§ 2254 Petition for Habeas Corpus for issues exhausted
at the Utah State court level.
GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

III.

NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: You may be barred from presenting additional grounds in a
future post-conviction petition if you fail to present any grounds that you could present here but
do not.
The following is a list of the most frequently raised grounds for relief in Post-Conviction
proceedings. Each statement preceded by a letter constitutes a separate ground for possible relief.
You should raise in this petition any of these grounds that apply and any other grounds not
listed that you may have available.
DO NOT MERELY CHECK THE GROUNDS LISTED. If you believe any of these
grounds apply to you. You must allege facts. The petition will be returned to you if you merely
check a ground and fail to list necessary facts or attach supporting documentation.

(a)

Conviction obtained by plea of guilty that was unlawfully induced or not made
voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of
the plea.
[5]
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(b)

(c)

Conviction obtained by use of coerced confession.
Conviction obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional
search and seizure.

(d)

Conviction obtained by use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest.

(e)

Conviction obtained by a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.

(f)

Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to
the defendant evidence favorable to the defendant.
Conviction obtained by a violation of the protection against double jeopardy.

(g)
(h)

Conviction obtained by action of a grand of petit jury that was unconstitutionally
selected and impaneled.

(I)

Denial of effective assistance of counsel.

G)

Conviction under an unconstitutional statute of constitutionally protected conduct.

(k)

Denial of right to appeal.

State concisely every ground on which you claim you are entitled to post-conviction relief.
Summarize briefly the facts supporting each ground. If necessary, you may attach additional
pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same.
GROUND ONE: Denial of effective assistance of trial counsel.
Supporting Facts for Ground One (state briefly without citing law or making argument):
(a)

Petitioner's trial attorney was ineffective when he moved for a directed verdict
based on insufficiency of the evidence, but failed to provide any reasons or specific
issues regarding the insufficiency of the evidence to the trial court.
[6]
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(b)

This resulted in an adverse ruling from the Utah Court of Appeals, which ruled that
the insufficiency of the evidence argument was not specifically presented to the trial
court and thus not preserved for appeal.

(c)

Petitioner's trial counsel should have brought to the trial court's attention the fact
that Petitioner's cultural background prevented him from forming the requisite intent
to commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse.

(d)

Petitioner's trial counsel should have brought to the trial court's attention that
Petitioner's lack of fluency in English and his intoxication impaired his ability to
understand the victim's demands that he stop his advances and leave her apartment.

(e)

Petitioner's trial counsel should have brought it to the trial court's attention that
there is insufficient evidence that any skin to skin contact with the victim's genitals
occurred. The Petitioner's PSI indicates that the Petitioner pushed his hand down the
front of the victim's pants, but that he did not touch her vagina.

(f)

The statute for Forcible Sexual Abuse requires that the offender touch the anus,
buttocks, or any part of the genitals of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-407(3) does not
list violations of Forcible Sexual Abuse as offenses where touching through clothing is

vJ

sufficient to constitute the relevant element of the offense.
(g)

Petitioner's trial counsel should have objected to the erroneous mens rea contained
in Jury instruction 17 for the offense of Forcible Sexual Abuse. The jury instruction
[7]
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lists as the fifth element for forcible sexual abuse "That said touching was done
L,, .

knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly." The statute for Forcible Sexual Abuse defines
the mental state required for the offense within the statute: " ... with intent to cause
substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person ... "
(h)

There is a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's unprofessional errors
and ineffectiveness, the results of the Petitioner's trial would have been different.

(b)
GROUND TWO: Petitioner was prejudiced by an erroneous jury instructions that
incorrectly informed the jury that the touching in a crime of Forcible Sexual Abuse could
be committed knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, even though Utah Code Ann. § 76-5404 (2010) specifies a different mental state, and that did not inform the jury that Forcible
Sexual Abuse requires skin to skin contact.
Supporting Facts for Ground Two (state briefly without citing law or making argument):
(a)

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-5-404 (2010) defines the mental state required for the offense
within the statute: " ... with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any
person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person ... "

(b)

Jury instruction number seventeen (attached), provided to the jury in Petitioner's
trial, lists as the fifth element that must be satisfied in order to convict the Petitioner of
forcible sexual abuse as "5. That said touching was done knowingly, intentionally, or
recklessly."
[8]
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(c)

The crime of Forcible Sexual Abuse specifies a specific mental state required and
the jury should not have been provided the instruction that the Petitioner could commit
the offense of Forcible Sexual Abuse knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly.

c)

GROUND THREE: Denial of effective assistance of appellate counsel.

Supporting Facts for Ground Three (state briefly without citing law or making argument):

(a)

The Petitioner had the same counsel of record listed for his trial and appeal.

(b)

Appellate counsel should have brought up his own ineffectiveness at trial in
Petitioner's appeal, which may have resulted in the Utah Court of Appeals ruling on
the merits of Petitioner's claims rather than ruling that the issues were not preserved
for appeal.

(c)

Appellate counsel was also ineffective for failing to bring up the additional
grounds listed in this petition, namely the prejudicial jury instruction and the fact that
the Petitioner never made skin to skin contact with the victim's genitals, breasts, or
buttcks.

(d)

There is a reasonable probability that but for appellate counsel's unprofessional
errors and ineffectiveness, the results of the Petitioner's appeal would have been

vi

different.

16.

If any of the grounds listed above were not previously presented in any other court,
[9]
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state or federal, state briefly which grounds were not presented and your reasons for not presenting
them:
Grounds one and three were not previously presented because they are associated with
Petitioner's representation during his case(s), and therefore could not have been presented
previously. Ground two was not previously presented due to ineffective assistance of trial
and appellate counsel.
17. Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney who presented you in the
following stages of the judgment being challenged:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Preliminary hearing: __
M_i_ch_a_el_R_.___S___i_ko_r.a. . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Arraignment and Plea: . . .; M; . ;. ; ; .; ;ica=h~ae"""'l-=R.; ;..; . . ;.; ; .S=ik; . ; ;.o.; ;.; ra"--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Trial: Michael R. Sikora
Sentencing:
Michael R. Sikora
Appeal:
Michael R. Sikora
(f) Post-conviction proceeding:_ _,..p___ro. . . . se
. . ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(g) Appeal from post-conviction proceeding:_ ___;;,;n/;;...;;a~-----------

18(a) Do you have any future sentence to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the
judgment being challenged?

- -Yes
(b)

X

No

_Not Applicable

If your answer is "Yes", give the following information:

(1) Name of Court: _ _ _ _ _ __
(2) Location: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(3) Case Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

I.V. REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER: If you do not attach the required copies or provide
an explanation of why you cannot provide them. This petition will not be filed and will be
returned to you. You may then lose your right to file a petition if the statute of limitations expires
before you file another petition.
19.
Attach a copy of the following documents to this petition or provide an explanation why
you cannot provide the copies.
[10]
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(a)

The judgment and commitment being challenged.
Attached

(b)

Any decision issued by an appellate court from the direct appeal.
Attached

(c)

Any previously-filed petition for post-conviction relief, and any decision issued as
a result.

NIA
(d)

Affidavits, records, or other documentary evidence that support your claim.
Attached

(e)

An affidavit of Impecuniosity and certificate from the Inmate Accounting Office,
if you are requesting waiver of the filing fee.
Attached

[11]
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V. PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATH

STATE OF UTAH

)
.ss

COUNTY OF

)

I the undersigned petitioner, declare under penalty of perjury that the information I have
provided in this petition is true and correct.

--~-·_··;;::::::::::::--~--'---;;y--~-o -$Mt,. n

rvl (J ok

Attorney Pro Se

'2t)--

,2013.

NOTARY PtJBUC

(I

mcHARD D pORT

668269

COMM19810N EXPIRES

&1PfflMIIIR 12, 2016
UTA'ffl OP UTAH

q /11,, llte
l

VI. CERTIFICATION OF ATTORNEY (If petitioner is represented by attorney).
I certify I am the attorney for petitioner, and that this petition copies with Rule 11 (Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure).
Signature of Attorney
Name of Petitioner:
Petitioner Address:

Rev.
09/2011
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INSTRUCTIONNO.

If

Before you can convict, the defendant, OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR, of the
offense of Forcible Sexual Abuse as charged in Count 2 of the information, you must find
from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the
following elements of that offense which is alleged to have occurred on or about May 28,
2009 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah:
1. That the defendant, OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR
(a) touched the breasts, buttocks, or any part of the genitals o f ~ E
or
(b) took indecent liberties with

J-~

2. That at the time of said touching, 11111 E

and
was 14 years of age or older;

and

3. That said touching was done without the consent of J-E

and

4. That said touching was done with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person; and
5. That said touching was done knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced

of the truth of each one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant guilty of Forcible Sexual Abuse as charged Count 2 in the
information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of
Count 2.
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76-5-404. Forcible sexual abuse.
(1) A person commits forcible sexual abuse if the victim is 14 years of age or
older and, under circumstances not amounting to rape, object rape, sodomy, or
attempted rape or sodomy, the actor touches the anus, buttocks, or any part of the
genitals of another, or touches the breast of a female, or otherwise takes indecent
liberties with another, or causes another to take indecent liberties with the actor or
another, with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or with
the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, without the consent of
the other, regardless of the sex of any participant.
(2) Forcible sexual abuse is:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (2)(b ), a felony of the second degree,
punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than 15 years;
or
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3), a felony of the first degree, punishable
by a term of imprisonment for 15 years and which may be for life, if the trier of fact finds
that during the course of the commission of the forcible sexual abuse the defendant
caused serious bodily injury to another.
(3) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (2)(b ), a court finds that a
lesser term than the term described in Subsection (2)(b) is in the interests of justice and
states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of
imprisonment of not less than:
(a) 10 years and which may be for life; or
(b) six years and which may be for life.
(4) Imprisonment under Subsection (2)(b) or (3) is mandatory in accordance with
Section 76-3-406.
Amended by Chapter 218, 2010 General Session
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76-5-407. Applicability of part -- "Penetration" or "touching" sufficient to
constitute offense.
(1) The provisions of this part do not apply to consensual conduct between
persons married to each other.
(2) In any prosecution for:
(a) the following offenses, any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
constitute the relevant element of the offense:
(i) unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a violation of Section 76-5-401, involving
sexual intercourse;
(ii) unlawful sexual conduct with a 16 or 17 year old, a violation of Subsection
76-5-401.2, involving sexual intercourse; or
(iii) rape, a violation of Section 76-5-402; or
(b) the following offenses, any touching, however slight, is sufficient to constitute
the relevant element of the offense:
(i) unlawful sexual activity with a minor, a violation of Section 76-5-401, involving
acts of sodomy;
(ii) unlawful sexual conduct with a 16 or 17 year old, a violation of Section
76-5-401.2, involving acts of sodomy;
(iii) sodomy, a violation of Subsection 76-5-403(1 );
(iv) forcible sodomy, a violation of Subsection 76-5-403(2);
(v) rape of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.1; or
(vi) object rape of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3.
(3) In any prosecution for the following offenses, any touching, even if
accomplished through clothing, is sufficient to constitute the relevant element of the
offense:
(a) sodomy on a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; or
(b) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a violation of
Section 76-5-404.1.
Amended by Chapter 128, 2000 General Session
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76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal responsibility.
(1) (a) A person is not guilty of an offense unless the person's conduct is
prohibited by law; and
{b) (i) the person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal
negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the
offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or
(ii) the person's acts constitute an offense involving strict liability.
(2) These standards of criminal responsibility do not apply to the violations set
forth in Title 41, Chapter 6a, Traffic Code, unless specifically provided by law.
Amended by Chapter 2, 2005 General Session
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

VS.

Case . No: 0919-05211 FS
Judge :
JUDITH S • ATHERTON
Date:
~ebruary 25, 2011

OSMAN MOHAMMAP NOOR,
Defendant.

PRESENT
Clerk:
shantec
Prosecutor: MAY, THADDEUS J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIKORA, MICHAEL R
Interpreter: Ahmed M. Ali (Somali}
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Language.: Somali
Date of birth:
Auq.io
·T ape Number:
S45-2 .22

Tape Count: 2.45

CHARGES

1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony
_P lea.: Not Guilty - Disposition.:
2. FORCIBLE SEXUAL -ABUSE - 2nd Degree
Plea~ Not Guilty - Dispof!ition:
3. LEWDNESS - FIRST OR SECOND OFFENSE
Plea: Not G.ui.lty - Disposition:

0.1/04/2011 Guilty
Felony
01/04/2011 Guilty
- Class B Misdemeanor
01/04/2011 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON

Based on the d~fendant's conviction of ~URGLARY a 2nd Degree
Felony, the de.f endant is sentenced to an indeterminate term -of _n ot
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FORCIBLE SEXUAL ABUSE a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an inde.terminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State J;irison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
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Case No: 091905211 Date:

Feb 25, 2011

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
To run concurrent.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court recommends cr~dit for time served.
reserved.

SENTENCE JAIL

Further restitution is

.o

Based on the defendant's conviction of LEWDNESS - FIRST OR SECOND
OFFENSE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is ·sentenced to a term
of 84 day (s)
Cre•dit is granted for time served.
Credit is. granted. for 8-4 · day(s) previously s·erved.
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
Count 3 is ordered credit time served.
Attorney Fees
Amoun~: $250.00 Plus Interest.
Pay in behalf of: S"ALT LAKE COUNTY PROBATION
Restitution
Amount: $1.550. 00
Pay in behalf of: VICTIM
Defendant transpo~ted.
Date:

~ /-,,,:;/t I
I

I

·page 2 {last)

~-
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FILED

UTAH APPEUATE COURTS

JUL 1 2 2012
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAI.S

-ooOoo-State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.
Osman Mohammad Noor,

Defendant and Appellant.

)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

)
)

Case No. 20110198-CA

)

FILED
Ouly 12, 2012)

)
)
)
)

2012 UT AEE 187

Third Disb'ict, Salt Lake Department, 091905211
The Honorable Judith 5. Atherton
Attorneys:

Brittany D. Enniss and Michael R. Sikora, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Michelle I. Young, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges McHugh, Onne, and Thome.
1HORNE, Judge:
,it
Osman Mohammed Noor appeals his convictions for burglary, see Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 2011 ), forcible sexual abuse, see id. § 76-5-404, and lewdness, see
id. § 76-9-702. Noor argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he
had the requisite intent to commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse, or burglary
premised on either of those offenses. We affirm.
Noor and the victim in this case, J.E., lived across the hall from each other in an
apartment building in Salt Lake City. J.E. was the aparbnent manager for the building.

,r2
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"'

On May 28, 2009, shortly after the building's ''quiet hours" began at 10:00 p.m., she
confronted Noor in the hallway about his loud music and other noisy behavior. As J.E.
':Vas about to reenter her own aparbnent, Noor walked past her and entered her
aparbnent through its open door, without her invitation. Noor refused to leave and
began disrobing, at which point J.E. called the police. Noor continued to remove his
clothing and make sexually explicit advances toward J.E., claiming that "he was a man
and that he loved [her]." Noor ignored J.E.'s physical and verbal objections, pulled J.E.
on top of him, attempted to kiss her, simulated oral sex over her clothing, and reached
his hand down the front of her pants and underwear. J.E. managed to push Noor away
and run from her apartment as a police officer arrived in response to her call.
,I3
Noor was arrested and charged with one count each of burglary, forcible sexual
abuse, and lewdness. At Noor's jury trial, the State called two witnesses, J.E. and the
responding officer. On cross-examination, Noor's counsel elicited testimony from both
wilnesses about Noor' s intoxication at the time of the incident and his limited English.
No witnesses testified for the defense, and the defense strategy appeared to focus on
discrediting J.E. At the close of trial, Noor's counsel made a motion for a directed
verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence. The district court denied the motion, and
the jury found Noor guilty of all charges.

114

On appeal, Noor argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove that he had the requisite intent to commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse. He
also argues that there was insufficient evidence that he entered or unlawfully remained
in J.E.'s apartment with the intent to commit lewdness or forcible sexual abuse. When a
defendant challenges a jury verdict for insufficiency of the evidence, "we review the
evidence and all inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict." See State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, ,r 15, 167 P.3d 503
(internal quotation marks omitted). We will reverse the jury's verdict "only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted." See id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).

However, we will not consider issues on appeal that were not preserved below.
See generally 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 'il 51, 99 P.3d 801 (discussing

,is

20110198-CA
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preservation requirements). "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be ...
specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness
before the trial court ... [so as to give] the trial court an opportunity to address the
claimed error, and if appropriate, correct it." State v. Santonio, 2011 UT App 385, ,r 29,
265 P.3d 822 {omissions and alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 275 P.3d 1019 (Utah 2012). "The mere mention of an issue without
introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue
for appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
CJ[6
Noor's insufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal rests largely on factual
allegations-some of which he apparently raises for the first time on appeal-regarding
his cultural background. Noor was born in Somalia and fled to refugee camps in Kenya
at the age of twelve. He lived there for the next seventeen years before coming to the
United States. Noor argues on appeal that, as abhorrent as it seems within our own
culture, subjugation and domination of women is acceptable and even encouraged in
the highly patriarchal Somali culture. Additionally, Noor presents authority stating
that rape and violence against women are prevalent in Kenyan refugee camps. Noor
argues that, in light of the violence he had witnessed for nearly his entire life, his actions
should be viewed only as a misguided attempt to express love and affection and that he
had no intent to commit forcible sexual abuse or lewdness. Noor also argues that his
lack of fluency in the English language and his intoxication impaired his ability to
understand J.E.'s demands that he stop his advances and leave her aparbnent.

17

Noor' s motion for a directed verdict did not bring these specific issues to the
district court's attention. His directed verdict motion stated, in its entirety, "I would
just move to-move for a directed verdict of acquittal based on insufficiency of the
evidence." The State offered no comment on the motion, and the district court
immediately denied it. This exchange did not apprise the district court that Noor was
asserting that his cultural background, intoxication, and difficulties understanding
English rendered him unable to form the requisite intent as to the crimes charged
against him. Thus, his argument on appeal "was not presented to the trial court in such
a way that it could have understood and ruled on•it." See Santonio, 2011 UT App 385,

'll 29.

20110198-CA
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'.118
Noor's insufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal was not specifically
presented to the district court and is thus not preserved for appeal. Accordingly, we
decline to address the merits of Noor' s argument, and we affirm his convictions.

,r9

WE CONCUR:

~!u?~~
Presiding Judge

I

20110198-CA

4
.;l!f'
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FILED

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

-ooOoo--

OCT 17 2012

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 20120676-SC

v.

Osman Mohammad Noor,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed on
August 9, 2012.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 51(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is denied.
For The Court

Dated_.-.;;/(}__-_/_7-_/_2--_
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FIL.ED DISTR1
lnlrd Judic1,St~RT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Novo 5 2013
Osman Mohammed Noor
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634
Attorney Pro Se

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

Osman Mohammed Noor
Petitioner,

*
*
*

AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY

vs.
State of Utah
Respondent.

:
*
*
*
*

Case No.:

·11J{P( lJ19lP[f
·1\J~tpf_i1f-=-L/

Judge: _ _

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF .SALT LAKE )

I, Osman Mohammed Noor, do solemnly swear that owing to my poverty I am unable to
bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings which I am about to commence (or the appeal
which I am about to take), and that I verily believe I am justly entitled to the relief sought by such
action, legal proceedings or appeal.

(a)
I, Osman Mohammed Noor, am a resident of
UTAH
and
incarcerated at the Central Utah Correctional Facility, P.0. Box 550, Gunnison, Utah 84634 .
My amount of income, including government financial support, alimony, child
support is $_ _ _ per month.
(b)

(c)

Assets owned, including real and personal property: _ _ _ _ _ __

Rev.
09/2011
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

(d)

Business interests: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(e)

accounts receivable:

(f)

securities, checking and savings account balances: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(g)

debts: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(h)

monthly expenses:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

--------------------

DATED this _ _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _~ 2013.

O~/YI ?( h /\/ 0

----------

:JR

Attorney Pro Se
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 11_ day of

({lc;t

2013.

f

SUBSCAJBeeANBQWOANTO

'Z-!

BEFORE ME ON THIS
OF {2(,lf_ I----BY

-DAV

Oznz {;'1 Jl1 /)Or'

OTARYPUBLIC
________N_ot_AA_V_PU_BU_C_ _

·

Rev.
09/2011

RICHARD D PORT
658269
COMMISSION EXPIRES
S&PT&MB&R 12, 2016

OTA'ffi o, UfAH
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Addendum C
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF {.JTAH

OSMAN M. NOOR,
Inmate# 200844
Petitioner,

ORDER REGARDING PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL

vs
Judge Vernice S. Trease
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

This matter is before the Court on Mr. Noor's recent letters requesting appointment of
counsel.
The Court had previously denied Mr. Noor's request to appoint counsel on the basis that
although an evidentiary hearing might be needed in this case, the issues of fact and law identified
in the Petition were not of a complicated nature such that assistance of counsel is required for
proper adjudication. The Court also took into consideration the content of Mr. Noor's Petition
and the other documents that he filed and determined that although English may not be Mr.
Noor's first language, it appeared from a review of the documents filed that he had a good
command of the English language such that appointment of counsel was not appropriate under
the statute. UCA 78B-9-109, does not require appointment of counsel based on the fact that a
Petitioner speaks another language.
Subsequent to this denial of Petitioner's request for appointed counsel, Mr. Noor has
sent letters and has indicated that he cannot read or write. In his letter dated March 15, 2014,
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Mr. Noor states, "This letter to you has been written by another person on my behalf due to my
inability to read and write English".
Accepting Mr. Noor's representation that he cannot read or write, the Court finds that this
will make it difficult for him to address the facts and issues in this case. The State has filed a
Motion to Dismiss and has raised issues that may be difficult for Mr. Noor to respond to ifhe is
unable to read the documents and write a response. The Court notes that Mr. Noor has filed a
Petition, documents, and letters that are articulate and so he must be receiving assistance from
someone if he is unable to read or write.
Accordingly, pursuant to UCA 78B-9-109, the Court appoints pro bono counsel to
represent Mr. Noor in this matter. The court clerk will notify the appropriate person at the Utah
State Bar of this order. Once pro bono counsel is secured, the Court will schedule further
briefing schedule and hearing. The Court will not require Mr. Noor to respond to the State's
Motion to Dismiss or set a hearing until pro bono counsel has been identified unless he wants to
proceed otherwise.

The court clerk will pull the case for a status review in approximately thirty

days (30) to see if pro bono counsel has been secured.
This shall be the Order of the Court; no further order is necessary.
DATED this 7th day of April, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 130907566 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL': OSMAN MOHAMMED· NOOR UTAH STATE PRISON P.O. BOX 250 DRAPER,
UT 84020
MAIL:
RYAN D TENNEY 160 E 300 SP O BOX 140854 SALT LAKE CITY UT
84114-0854
04/08/2014

/s/ JENNIFER WILLIAMS

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 04/08/14 16:08:06

Page 1 (last)
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Addendum D
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

~

OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR,

MINUTES
LAW AND MOTION

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No: 130907566 RN

STATE OF UTAH,

Judge:

VERNICE TREASE

Date:

April 27, 2015

Respondent.

VJiP

Clerk:

amyb

PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: SAMUEL ALBA
Attorney for the Respondent: DANIEL W BOYER
Audio
Tape Number:

CR

W45

Tape Count: 9:00-12

HEARING

Counsel for Mr. Noor is present by telephone. The Court has scheduled this matter for a
status

conference and the defendant has been excused. Counsel for the defendant makes

a record of the receipt of the case prior to this hearing. Counsel indicates they need
more information regarding the defendant's Petition.

The State may have a copy of the

transcript from the trial in question for case number 091905211. The Court indicates
there is a transcript on the docket which the Court will provide to counsel. Counsel
moves the Court for 45 days to file an amended petition. Counsel is to file the amended
petition on or before 6/26/15 and responses are to be filed on or before 8/14/15. Once
that is filed the Rule 7 time will begin. Clerk to set hearing if needed.
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Addendum E
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SAM ALBA (0031}

ROBERT W. LIN (15190)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange l'lace!I Suite 1l 00
Salt Lal<e City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400

sa(@.scmla'w_.com
rwlc'luscmlaw.com

Attorneys.for Petitioner Os,rzan -Mohammed Noor
IN
.. THE THTRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT'LAKECOUNTV,STATRQ-FUTAff

OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR~
Petitioner,
vs.

Amended Petition for Relief Urtder tbe:
Post-Conviction Remedies Act

Utah Code S~ction 78J3'-9~1:01~ et s~q~
Utah Rules of C1vilProc~dure 65C

THE STATE OF UTAH,

Givil No~ 130907566_.
Judge: VeQ1it?~ 'Trea~e:

:REQlJEST FO~ RELIEF
Petitionet Osn;ian Mobam.med Noor is curre,ntly incar¢er~ted,in the Utah SU!te-Prison located

ih l 4425Bitterbrush Lane; Draper, Utah .. Putsuantto Utah Code Ann. 78B-.9-f0 t, et secv, and.Rule
-

65C of

'

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, M~. Noor respectfully ret1uests po~t-cohviction relief:'
Iy1.r. Noor understands that this petition raises important factual issues regarding the ac1ioD:s of

his coui1sei Mr. Sikora arid the abilitr of the Court providec:t Somali ti·anslators·. rvir.. Noor·

te·spectfuliy requests that the Court al.lo,v hiP1: to conduct discovery on the faytua.l issues surroUI1dip.g·
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thfapeti tion.

NO'TICJD TO -pIE PETITIONER: BEFORECOMPLETJNG THIS FORM., PLEASE READ IT
CAREFDL:LY., IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS., _CONTACT AN-ATTORNEY•. COURT
CLERKS ARE ·Nor ALLOWED TO GIVE LEGAL APVICE. ArrAd-I ADOITim.JAL SHEETS.
OF PAPER AS NECESSARY TO CO?vIPLETE YOUR ANSWERS. SHOWTHE,QOESTION
NUME{ER FROM·THlS FORM ON THE.ADDITIONAL ~HEET OF PAPER.

I.

IL

NAME OF REsPONDENT (Check One)'
~ Co~vi~tfon of Feloi1y:
_ Convi~tfo.ti qf Mis{\emeanor or Ordinan~e:
_ Conviction of ~sdemeanot or Ord:itiMce!

State Qf Utah
County of S~lt Lake

Municipalizy of Salt Lake City

µJ.ENTIFICA'J.'TON OF.CURRENT AND REJ:,ATED CASES

l.

(a) Name of court 11mt entet~d the judgment being chal1enged: Third iudiciaf'
Court. State of Utah.
(b) Location of Court: 4 50 South State Street, Salt Lake City. Utah 841 ti.

(c) Case Number: 09190521 L

J~1:1ary: 4, ~Q_l J.

2.

Date of Judgment bei_ng challenged:

3_.

-Septence~ Two o:cteto: fifteen-year sentences.served corictirteritly furBurglary arid
'Forcible Se~iiat: As~~tilt: ·g4 days f(!t Lewdnes~ - First-or Sec~nd O~rt~e,. .

Natur~ of offens¢ nwol v'ed' (a]J ·co,ll:nts); Charge_ 1:_ B~~mx- 2nd Degree Felony; .·
Charge·2; Forcible Sexual Assault.: 2nd Degree Felony; Charge 3:"Lewdness ·- .
.First ·or ·Setcind Offense. Class B ·Misd~m~a±ior.: .
.. .

5.

WBat was your plea? (Pheck One)

~Notm:i-llcy
_ Gt,tijty

No·. Contest

. - Guilty and: J.\ifentaflyill
_Not guilty oy reason of insanity

1f yott .el)tere(l ·~ ple~ of guilty t.6 som~ comifa~ an~ a not .guilty plea to other
counts,•give your plea td. each ¢ount:Not ApjJ_Hcable:

7·..

if you ~ted tiot guiJfy 9r nm; guilty ~Y ~~ason of insanity., was~<? irlal-b~fore a
4- Jtirj

_.fodge
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8.

Did you t~stify at the trial?

Yes
9.

~No

Did you "appeal from the conviction or sentence?
~ Yes

\0.

No

If your answer is ':yest provide the following irifo1mation:

(a) Name- of Appellate Court:· Utah Court of Appeals;
(b) · Case Number: 20110198-CA..
(c) R~sult: The Court of Appeals declined to address the merits of Mr. ~foot's

~4 affirmed bis conviction;
(d) ·pate. ofiesult or citation of opinion:

argume~l

July 19. 2012.

(e) Grounds· Raised:. The State of Utah failed to present sufficient evidence that
ho had the requisite intent to commit lewdness or forcible· sexual abuse, or ··
b·urularv premised on either of those offenses.
(t) Did you seek further review of this appeal?'
~

Yes

No

(~) Ifyo~ answ¢r is "''yes.," pt~oyide the following -inforni.ati9m
(1} Name ofJ1eviewing Court: Utah Supreme·Court.

(2)· CaseN\1mber: 20120676-SC.
·
.(3) R.esuit; The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was denied.
(4)· Pate of result ot citation of opinion:• October 17_~ 2012.
(?) Orounds Raised: The Court of Appeals erred 'When it concluded that
Defense Counsel had-not preserved· a claim that the State. presented
insufficient evidence as to iritent even though.deforised:n.uisel made a motion·
for directed verdict below.
11.

Ifyoti. did not appeal froni your conviction or s~ntence, why not? Not Appiicable

as- the conviction was appeal.

-

12.
(a) Other tharl.your'direct appeal from your convictiori or sentence, have you filed
~ny petitions,. applications~ or motions with respect to thls conviction or sentence in
court, state ot fe~eral?
~ Yes
No

any

(b) If your ~W~ is .:yes," provide the following mfonnation:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(1) Name of court: The Uruted States· District Court, District of Utah.
(2) CaseNumber: 2:13-cv-00738-TS·.
(3) Result The Court dismissed the petition without prejudice.
(4) Date ofresu1t or citation of opinion: March 16... 2015.
(5) Grounds Ra1sed: The Utah Court of Appeals erred when h affimied Mr.
Noor,s:conviction based on a lack of preservation, a~d refusedto adai·ess the
merits ofMr. Noor's claims.
·
(c) Did you receive ati evidetitiaiyhearing on.yourpetition,.application, or

motfon? ·
Yes

·

·

~No

(d) Djd yqu appeal th~ decision on:your petition, applicatfo~ or motion?
Yes
~No

(c) If your answer is ''yes,>' provide the following info11J1atfon::·
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Name of court:

Case Num bcr:
Result:
Date of result or citation of opinion:
Grounds Raised:

(a) .Othertban the c~e describ~d in qu~~tion 12,.ha.v~ y(>u filed any .(u~het-·
petitions!! ~pplica:tio~, ormotfons withrespe_ct.io th.fs convictfon=or sentence:irtany cowt,

13 ...

st.ate:orfederal?.

-

Ye:r

~No

(b) If your answer is. ~'yes,'' provide, the fol lowing information:·

Name of court:
(i), Gase·Nun)b~r=-

(1).

(3) Result:
(4) Date of result or citation of opinion:

(5) Qr9uf1ds Raiseq~

·

(c) Did you receive au evidentiary hearing on. your petition, application, or ·
motion?
Yes
No
(d) Did you appeal the decision oh your petition, applfo~tip~ 6.r inotion?
Yes
No
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(e) If your answer fa "yes," provide the followfag infom1ation:
(1) Name of court:
(2) Case Number:
(3) Result:

(4) Da~-of result or citation of opinion:.
(5) Grounds Raised:

14..
(a) Do you hav~ -any petition~ appeai; ~r motion now pending in.any· court~ state o;·
fodetai, relating to thejudgm~nt being challep.ged:
Yes
xNo.
(b) If your answer is Hyes/' provide the following_ infonnat1on:.

(1) Name of court:
(2) Cas¢ number::
(3) Nfl:-Wie of proceeding:

m.

GROUNDS FoR~EJ:iIEF
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER:

You MAY BE BARRED FROM PRESENTING

_ADDITIONAL GROUNDS 1N A FUTURE POST-CO'NVlC.TION J>ETlTJON lF YOU PAlL"'f~
PRESENT ANY GROUNDS THAT YOU COULD PRESENT HERE ~OT DO NOT!.

THE·FoLtb\¥1NG.JS' A t1stoF'mEMQST FREQUEN'll,YRAiseo GR~UNPs FOR ~~4IEF
INP~ST-CONViCTION PROCEEDJN<:is. e~cf:l STATElvIBNTfRECEDE9,BYA LEJTER
· CONSTI'l"QTES·A SEPAMTB GROUND fdR ,PQ$S,LBLR~lEf:., YOP $HQQLD R_AISE;TN

-,i,flls PBrITiONANY OF THEs'E QkotrNDs-THAT APPLY AN»·~ 6THE1t·cRoUNDs·
Not i~JsTED·THAt YouMAv l:fAVB'AVAJ.LABLE •.

DO.NOT MEREL); CHSCKTH:E' GROUNDS LISTED. TF. YOU-BELTEVE ANY OF THESE.
~PLY ·vou~
l\'].UST~LEGE. ]!ACTS. _THE PETITIQN WILL BE .
RETURN'JID
CHECK A GROUND ANO FAILTO .LIST
.. . . TO YOU IF-YOUMERELY
.
NECESSARY FACTS.OR ATTACH SUPPORTJNG DOCUMENTATION.~

tou

~b

GRoTJNDS

~

.

-

-

.

-

'

(a) ~onvictfon obtained by plea.of gµiity that was unlawfully induced or.not mad~
voluntariiy with understatidmg of the natur~ ofthe charge and. the conseqq~nces of the pl¢a.
(b) C9nviction obtained by 'use of coerced confession,

(c) C;:!onviction obtained by use of evidence gai11ed pursuant~ ai1 tmconstitutional sea.reµ. ?Jid
seizure•.
(d) GonVictfon o'.btairicd by use of t;vidern;;e Qbtained pur~uant to an unlawfu.1.ar.rest
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(e) Conviction obtained by a v.1olatfon.ofthe privilege against self-in¢~ination~
(f) Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure ofth~prosectrti6n to disclose fo the
defendant evidence favorable to the defendanl

(g) Conviction obtained by a·violation ofth.eprotection:a~ainst double jeopardy.
(h) ·.Cpnvi¢ti'o~ ·obtain~d by acti~i1 of a grand or :petitjucy tl)at was· l,ll1coJistitutionalli,s¢Ject¢d
-~d impaneled.

(i) Denial of effcciiv~ ~ssistanc~ ofcounsel.

G) _Conviction unc\cr: an unconstitutional statute or constitutionally. pro.tecled conduc~
(~} Deriiat of tjglJt.to appeal.
l~.
State copcisely ever:y' ground on which you c)EJ,im you are _entitled to postconviction l'elief. Summarize·. bri~fty·th~ fac~· supporti~g ea.ch groun& lf necessary, you i,nay
attach additional pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting sam¢.

(a) GROUND ONE: Mr. Noor;s counsei was per se ineffective for-failing to seek a
competent interpreter for Mr~ Noor at trial.
· · ··· · · · - · - ·
· · ··
SUPPORUNO·~ACTS FOR qRo{)ND, O~E (};_tar~·brj~fly "J:1 1lfhouf ~m~¥, law qr m~ki?~gqrm1mentJ~:

lVfr~ Noor had.'a dif:fi¢tiittin;i~~un,4~.sf.m.i~gJp,e trans.l~tionatttiaJ~ Pti~tq :tlie la(?lc 9£-:~ct~q~te·

translation~ h~ ~id notknoW what w~·gQfog, OD:: Mr... Noor tQlcH,fr., 1,ikor~th~t hiwas havipg -~
difficuit ti~e-j.ui~~ts~ndirig~ but¼~ $~or~ ~411:ot ~Q; -anytl1ing!_· A~- a·r4s~l~/ ~r•.N9ot·gid
even -qnderstand his, accuser's testimony agaiTTsthfoi! ·Under: tb,ese. •irciunstances~ Mr~ Noor was:

?Ot:

d~ptiyed :ofhis rjghtt6· commtmicat~ ~th:Jlis attorney durµtg ti;ifji as. ·gµ~·ant~ed by th~ -~bgh- .
Amendmentand tller~_is a pt~suniptiop.,th~t•Mt. No9t wa,s.ptejµ4i9e;d~ . ll,t$,ott, tb1$ mt~atio11j~
.so· likely to prejudice. Mt~ Noor that the Court should find'. th~tMr.~ Sikor~was Mrse)neffo~tiv·e

f¢r fttlling t6. ens"Qt~ that Mr. Noot 1it)derstood what was .h~pp_enmg aJ trfal;; ~specially since'Mr~

Noor co1~plained ~bout it to Mr. Stkora.

·

·

(b}GRO:oND :TW.O_:. .J~ven ift~e Court applied th~rSttickland standard,. Mr;Noor?s: counsel
was.stiUineffect1ve for fillirigfo seek a com1)etent intenJreter fbrlv.1:r. 1:T~or a~ ·trial_ . .
. SUPPORTING FACTS .FOR GROlJNti l'wq (iltate briefly ~without citing law of mq[dn~ argumer,.t) ~L

Mr. Sikorashouid have umler$to9d·his obligation to D;)ak,e sure.th.at Mr. Noor uridersiood:what
,vas happ~nin'g at trfuL .Mr. Sikma, ~hould haye understoqd th~ iinportan.¢i of aJlowirig_Mr~. Noqt
t¢ p~ci:pate·inlii~_ 9yvn d_efe~e.

Yet., at trial, Mr. Noor told Mr. Sikora that.he w~>~aving'~
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difficult time understandlng the translation at trial, but Mr. Sikora did not do anything. Mr.
Sikora failure to object oi otherwise takes steps to obtain another interpreter at trial was deficient
as to fall below an objective standard for reasonableness.
·Mr.Noor was prejudiced. by not understanding the tdal proceedings for two reasons as follows:.
First, there was only oti~ witile~s to the alleged crime at trial-the ·alleged victim J.E. She
testified that Mr. Noo.r lµrrassed·her m.her apartment If Mr. Noor haclundetstood J.E.'·s·
testimony, be ~6uld have told Mr~ s·jkor~. thaf J.E. was romantically 1nterested in him, and ~ii~
wasjea16us .of his relatiopsbip with another _person .. So there was a motive forJ .E. to lie. On
cross~examination, Mr. Sikora did not ask about these issues. 111 closing, the State of Utah.
bol$tered th~ testimony of i.E. by arguing that.she had no motive to 'lk Specifically, the State
·argu~ ,;Why· did [J.E.] 9ome h~re .a year ag<:> to ~ ptelintlnary hearih.g, and t~stify., ahc;l tell peop~e
these ugly, ugly things about what happened to her? Why is she here today? Why qid she
unmedJateJy 9all thepolic~r (Trial Transcript at 1()3:13-17, attached as Exhlbit H.} IfMr..
Sikora had· challengeg, J.R ,_.s credibility aI).d provided the jury a reason as to· why IE. would lie,
there is reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Mr~ Nqor.

Second, J.E. accused·:tvrr~ Noor of going into.her apartment and harassing her! Mr. Noor,
however, contends t.h~t be was never-in J.K's apartment. If Mr. Noor had under~tood the trial
proceedings, he would have. be~n able to ask Mr. Siker~ to c:ross-e~e. th~ State's witnesses·
as to whether the State had any fingerprint, DNA, or other physicai evidence that- Mr. Noor was
in J.E.'s apartment-there.was none~ IfMr. Sikora had done_ soilhi.s·W~uld have undermined the
State's case against Mr._ Noor. Jfthc jurylmew there was n6·.fii1getprint, DNA, or oth~t phy~ical
evid.eM~ plach1g Mf No.or inside J.E/ ~ apartment,. ~here is a r~oriable probibilify that th~ jmy.
wou14 not have co1tvict¢'d. Iv.fr. Noor~
.

.(c)'GR011ND' Tl-IREE: ·Mr. Sikora was· ineffective because he would not Jct Mt. Noor-aid in
his tlwn defense prior to tr1aL
.
SUPPORt.iNG FACTS FOR GROUNP·THR.EE{Slafe·
6riejly without citing law .or making argument);
.

Mr; Sil~Qra ~hc,mld t,~veknown that.it was important to hear Mr.-N'oor'sversion of what
.happened on May is, 2009, Also, Mr. Sikora should h~ve lmo\v11 thatlvir. Noor.was- a valuable
and important resource hi ai'ding in his own defense. It was unreasonable for Mr. Sikora to
refuse to. let Mr. Noot tell }li~ side 9f the story~ It is unrea~onable for Mr. Sikora fail to make sure
that that Mr. Noor un4erst6od the police report so that Mr, Noor could aid in his own defense.
Mr. Noor was prej~diced for twq reason~ as follows:
First, 1:1s stated above; tllere was only one witness to the all'eged crime-tfa~ alleged victim J.E..
llt t~stifi~ci that Mr. Noor w~~t into her apartment to harass her_ IfMr. Sikora. would have
a.1.Jowed Mr~. Noor to participate in his own defense, Mr. Sikora would have known that Mr. Noor
b.eli~ve_d that J.E. lied beca_.use she wasjealous: of lvlr. Noor and the person he was dating~ Mr.
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Sikora would have bee11-able to in.vest:igate this issue. Mr~ Siko;ra woqld ~~v~ bee_nable. to talk to
Mr. Noor' s. brother~ the perso11 Mr. Noot was dating, and other people in the apartment tp support
tl1is theory. If Mr. Sikora had done so, there was.a reasonable probability .that Mr. Noor's
account of what happened would have been bol~tered, and J.E. credibility would 'haye been.
damaged such that there is a rf!asonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Mr.. Noor.Second~ if Mr. Sikora had allowed Mr. Noor t.o participate in his 0.wn defense~ Mr. Sikqra.. would
haye known that Mt; Noor was never' in J.E. ts. apartment. Mt. Sikora would have· been.a.°!)le. to ·
investigate tlw lack of fingerprint, DNA:,. and pbysic~ eyidence to show that Mr .. Noor was· in.
J.E.'s apartment lfMr. Sikorahad·done so1 there was areasonableprobabilitythattbejury ·
would have acquitted Mr~ Noor for lack of physical evidence~
(d) ~QUND FOUR: Mt. Sikora was ineffective for failing to· advise Mt. Noor of the risk.of
.deportatfon if a jlir)' found him guilty~
SUPPORTING FACTS FOR: GRQUNI) FOUR. 'r;tate· briefly without

citing law or making argumen~r•

Mr~ Sikora did not ten Mr. Noor how the charges would or could affect his iminigration status.

Nor- did, 1,fr~ Sjkora tell IVI:r,. Noo;r that he could· be deported if he went to trial and was cfohvlcted
of the charges agafostbim. In-vieyv"ofthe Supreme Court's recognition of the prevailing
professional norm that counsel must so advise., Mr. Sikora was unreasonable not to do so.

Mr. Sikora failed to tellM.r. Noor~t he would be deported if found guilty of the charges against
If.Mr"': Sikora ru;id·Mt~ Noor understood thatMr.. Noor, ifhe was found guilty, could be
Q'eported b.ac~ Jo S.omal_i&-a:plJic~ wJlere Mr~ Noor i~. at q~k of de~th, iOrll:lfe., and 9fu.~r· ~el,
inhum~ or dewadin~ ~~atin~nt~tner.:could hav~·pursued a ]?l~a btttgain· to a; ~~sset ptjnii~at
WQ\Ald 11ot re$~1t·µi. hfa dep9.rtattoA~ :(So~ 2014 H\µli~ Rig~ts Report·; at~c;hed. ~- Eihibit J.).
lri actditfon,·a;s statedabov~;ibere:was only one.witiless tp the~lleg~dcrime,JE~ ·tfMr. 1Sik9r~:
wcmld'have told t1ii Sni:te·of !-E..&s motive to· iie and if Mr. Sikora wtiulg have~presse~-~~e State\
lac!( of physicafeviclence;• tl_l¢re. is a reasonable- probability,that the: Sta,t¢. w6,Uld have. offered Mr~
'.Noot ·a plea deal. .In aqditio~ there is· a reaspn~ble .prob~b'ility that iv.Ir. Sik:tmi• cotjld have· and.
·shoW4 haye yQ'.Q.viuc~d N,b,\ Noor to. ~cc;ept that d~aJ in view ofthe _seri.c;fµs:rjsk of depo~tation.
back- to 8op1alja.
~
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16.
Jf any of the grounds listed abov~ were not _previously presented in any other
court, state or federzj,_ $late brie:Q.y which grounds were not presented and your reasons for not
presentitlg them:
The grounds iisteci above were not previously presented. The Utah Supre1ne Court has held 'U1at
"trial counsel cannot reasonably be expected to raise the issue of his or her.- own incompetence [at
trial and] on appeat=, Archeuleta v. Galetaka, 2011 UT 73,, 35, 267 P.Jd 232. Here, Mr.
Noor's.trial ~ounsel? Mr! Sikora, ~muld not be expected to raise the 1ssue of his own
111effectiveness at trial, In addition, Mr. Sikora represented Mr. Noor on apPeaL Mt. Sikora also
cannot reasonably be expected to raise the i'$s1,1e of hi's own ineffectiveness at trial on appeaL
J7_
Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney \\7ho represented you h1 the
lollowing sf.ages of the judgment being challenged..

(a) ;Preliminary hearing; Mich~el R. Sikora,. Salt-Lake Legal Defend~i;
Association, 424 East 5QO South, Suite 300~ Salt Lake City~ Utah .84111.
(b) Arraignment: and plea: Michael· R. ·Sikora,· Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association, 424 East-500 South, Suite300, Sa!t.Lakc City,Ut~h 84111.
(c)• Trial: Michael R. Sikora, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East
500 South, Suite·J00, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
(d) $enten,cing:: Michael R. Sikora, Salt ~ e L_egaJ Defe.qder Association~ 424
East 500 South; Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
.
(e) A.ppe~;: Micha.elR SikorBr @cl Brittany D, EAni~s; SaltLak¢ Legal Defender
A~spciat:ion, 42_4-East 500 South, Suite. 300; Salt Lake Chy,. Utah 841 ll;
(f) Post-Co~vi<?tion:proceeding:. Previously withdrawn attorneys Blain~· ~t Benard
and M- B~jai;nfu Machlis, Holland & Hart, 222: S~ Mafo Street, Suite 2200, Salt
take ¢fry; tJ~ ·84l OL CllITent ~ttomey$ Sam A.Joa and: llo~ert Lin~ Sno·w;
Cbristehsen ~Martineau, 10 Exchange Place,. ~-lth:floor:r Salt Lake City? Utah
&4111.
.
.
(g)' •Appeal from post-conviction proceeding:: Not Applicable~
18

(a)

Do you have any fuµ.u-e sentence to serve.after you complete the sentence;.

imposed by the judgment beirtg challenged?.

·

Yes

KNo

(b) lfyour answer is ''yes', give the following huonnation:
(1) N~e of court.
(2) Location:

(3) Case number:
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-IV.

REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS
NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER:· IF YOU DO NOTA1TACH THE REQUIRED CO.PIES

08=,-

P~OVIDE:AN EXPLANA.TiON WHY YOU CA,.NNOT PR(?VIDE TB.EM, THIS PETITION WILL
NOT.BE FILED AND WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU, You MAy THEN LC>"S&YOUR RlGHT
FILE A PETITION IF TH.E STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXPIRES B'EFOREYOU FILE·
ANOTIIERPETITION~

ro

t 9~ ·Att@h a copy of the f9ll9wing documenis to this petition or provide an.
exp_iaiiat:ion whyyou ca~mot providethe copies~ ·
- ·
··
(~) Tlie judgment aruf .c9ri:rn1itrp,~n.f being challbµged,
· (See;Docket at 18-19~ ~ttached as cyhibitB.)

(b) Any 4eci~fon issued· ·by ru1 appel1ate. ·court from the ,din~~t appeal
(See State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 187, ~1:4t9h~d a~rE~hibit C}
(c) Any previously-filed petitioPc for post-c0nv~ctioµ relief,} ~d: any d~cision
issued as a result.
··
· ·
(See Habeas Petition, attached~ Exhibit D.)
(See Memorandum DecisJon and Or4er Granting Motion tq Disnfo~1r
Habeas Petition, attached ~s Exhibit lf)
(d) Affidavits, records, or otb~r documentary evide~ce that support your claim.
(See Affidavit of Osman Mohammed Noor,. attached as Exhibit F.)
(See AppellanCs Brief~ attached as Exhibit G.)
(See Portions of Trial Transcript;_. attached .as· Exhibit H.)
(Se.e: ,Porti9ns of?r~-Serj.te1i9e .(lbportj::~1:!ac¥ed._a.s Expi~it I.)
(See .Stat~ Dep~ent Soiµalia io i:4!. ltmtian.· RJgbts' Rypo~_ .ci.Wt:ch~d as

J3~hil;>it J.).

.

..

. .-

(~) An-~davh .9fnnp~ctirii gsify'auo c¢i6c~t~ ftQtn flte lbinate .Accounting

:Qffice,.ifyou afa reqtiesiliut a.waiver oftlfotiliggfee:

. (Not Applicable.)

-

.

(f) Memor}Jn.dl.IDl'. o'f°V.pints .and Autlioijtjes~ ..
(~e<t, Memorandum of Points and Authority, m.Support. of Osman
MohammadN~:iot,S Nru~~iic;ied petition. fot:Relief under llie·Post.:.
Co~VictioliS R~medics· Act, attached .ag. Exhibii A}
.
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V.

PETITIONER'S VERIFICATION UNDER OATll

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

L the undersign~d ·petitioner> declare under penalty of perjury that the information I have
provided in this petition is true and correct.

SIGNATURE OF PETJTlONER

Subscribed ·an~ sworn to b~fpre me on:
NOTARY PUBLIC

. RON HINCKLEY
657775

COMMISSION EXPIRES
AUGUST 27,.2016

C

~~..:....:....::.....:..s.._

....:;:..c_~J.;_-

Nc/TARYP
Re'sidaig in: -$1ft. 'f'"" llh(c •
My Commission Expires: "Z7l1¢o{.G

STATE OF UTAH

VI.

CERTl.FICATION OF ATTORNEY (lfpetitioner is

repre~ented by attorney)

I _certify I ani the attorney for petitioner,. and that this petition complies with Rule 11, Utah Rules

of Cjvil Ptoce4,ure.
SIONATURE OF ATTORNEY

Name of Petitioner: Osman Mohammad Noor
Addr~ss;: C/O Sam Alba. Snow:, Christensen & Martineau, TO Exchange Place, 11th Floor~ Salt
Lake CityUtali 84i 1i~
. - ..
.
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Exh1.·-1tA
.

••

. • ~-,

,..

1.

.

.

• -·•

..

-·

•
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•

~

SAMALl3A(0031)
ROBERT W. LJN (15190)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
-Salt Lake-City, UT 8411' T
Telephone: (801) 5~1-9000
Facs~e: (801) 363-0400

sa.(@,scmlaw.com
rwlf@scrnlaw.com

AftorneysforPetitionel" Osman. A1ohammed Noor
IN THE THIRD JtJDiCIAL OISTRlCT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE.OF UTAH

OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR,

l\ffiMORANDUM Of .POINTS AND
AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF OSMAN
MOHAMMAD NOOR'S AMENDED

Petitioner~

PETlTION FOR RELIEF UNDER THE
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT

vs.
-

'

THE STATE OF UTAf!,
Civil No. 130907566

Rcsponden.~~-.
Judge: Vernice Trease

INT'RQDUCTION

Mr. Noor -f~ .a refugee from Somalia. He does not '111~¢rsta.nd, speak, or· t~a,d Ehgl.ish
welt .Oti May 28, '.400~>", Mr. Noor was ai:rested based on accu~ations from the. manager of his.

apartment building, J.E.,, tbat he went into her apartm~nt to hfrrass her. On July 6, 2009,. Mr.
Noor was· charged with one qount of burglary, one count of forcible se:imalabuse, and one count
.

'

of lewdn·ess. Because he was found indigent; he was assi&111ed. an attorney from the. Legal
.

Defender's Office, Mike Sikora;
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1vir. Noor met with Mr. Sikora prior to trial, hut Mr~ Sikora would not let Mr.: Noor tell
his version

of what happened 011 May 28,

2009. Also, Mr. Sikora did not make Sl;lre thf!t Mr!

·Noor understood the. police rep61t against hlm. In addition; Mr. Sikora did not tell Mr~ Noor tha~
th~ ch~ges against Jilin would affect his immigration .status;. Jf Mr.

Noor

would· have· been·

aUow~d to tell lvfr. Sikora his version of the event, he would have told Mt. Sikora that J.E. had. a
m~tive·to lie. In addition, Mr. Noor would have told tvir: Sikora ~1at he had neve~. be~ in J.B. s
2

-_apa$1ent.
At trial,. Mr. Noor had: a difficult time Undci·standing tbe trans1atioIL I-ie did iiof know
what was· going on. He· did not understand his accµser's. testimony -~gainst him.: Mr. Noor toid
Mr. Sikora that -he- w&S· bgiving a hard time understanding, but

Mr. Sikora did not do- a.nytbing.

The jury found Mr. Noor griilfy.

REQ~ST FOR.RELJE~·
Pursuant~ Utah Code Ann. 7813-9-101, ~t seq;, and Rule 65C of the Ut~'Rufos of Ci~1

P~9cyditre, Mr.. ~00{ respectfully requests post-convfotio~ relief bec~µ~e {1) Mr. Sikora was ,:per

·se· i_ri~eqtive for· ra.iling· to Seel~ a c~mpe~~nt interpreter· for Mr. Noor, at trlat;. (2)

even 'if the

Court were to app_l~ the Strickland.. stru;idard, ¼. Silcora was still iheffec#ve: for failing to. seek a

~otrtp.etertt interpreter for~:. Noor at triai; (3) :tvir. Si~ora was meffe9tiv~ 1:lecause h~ 'fail~d let
Mr: Noor aid in }ili;. own -defense prior to tdal; and (4) Mt.. Sikora y.ras ineffective for failure Lo
advise Mr. Noor of the risk of deportation if a jury found: him guiltt

Mr, Noor 1,111derstands that this petition raises important factual ·,issues -regarding

th6

actions·: of Mr. ·Sikora ~nd the ability 9f the court provided Somali" .h-anslators~. Mr. Noor

2
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respectfully requests that the Court allow Mr. Noor to conduct discovery on the factual issues
surrounding this petition~

STATEMENT OF FACTS
J.

Procedural History of Mr. Noor's Criminal Case

I.

1vfr~ Noor is a refugee from Somalia He speaks, read, and understands. very little·

English. (Noor Affidavit, attached as Exhibit F.)

2'.

On May 28,2009, Mr. Noor was an-ested based

of hh,· apartment building,

on a~c-µsations from the manager

J.E. .((See Docket Case No. 091905211 at 1~ attached herein a~

Exhibit B.)
3.

On July 6~ 2009~ Mr. Noor was·charged with one countt,fburglary.1 one count of

forcible sexual abuse, and one count of lewdness - first: or second offense. (Id.. at 2.)
4.

Mr. Noor was represented by Michael Sikora (Id. at 1.)

5~

On October 23,. 2009, Mr. Noor pleaded not guilty f.o the charges .. (Id at L.)

6.

On- January 4,. 201t a jury trial was held for Mr. Noor. (Id at 16-l 7;)

7.

There were two witnesses at .trial,. the alleged victim J..E. 1 ~d the Officer

re~p611~ngat the scene Daniel. Davis~ (id at 11.)

8':

J.E., the alleged victint, was the o~ly witness to the. alleged crime, Office Davis

resp911d~d to the scene after the all~ged crime took place.
· I\tfr. Noor did not testify, (Id. at 17.)

10.

The jury found Mr. Noor guilty on all three counts. (Id at 16.)

11.

Mr. Noor was .sen1enced to two one to fifteen year sentences to be served

concurrently for Burglary and forcible Sexual Assault and 84 days for Lewdness. (Id at J8-19.)

3
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12,.

Mr~ _Si_kora appealed the case ·~1g that the State failed to present suffi~ient

evidence that Mr. Noor had_ the r~quisite intent to ·commit lewdness or forcible

sexual abuse, pr

i,; Noor, 2012 Ut App 187, ii.l, 283.P.3d 543.
The Cpurt of Appeals declined to address· the. ~ppeaj. on the m~tits tipding that

burglary. State
13.

Mr. Noor~sdnsµlficiency o[ ev.idence ar$Ument on appeal was not &pecifically presented• to the

distr{~t coµrt and is th~ not preserved, for apJ?eal. Id. at if' 8~

14.

Mt. ~ikor8:· filed a. petition for writ of certiorari to the Ut$ Suprcrn~ Gourt. The.

Utah Supreme 'Court denied· that petition~ S,tate·\1• Noor, 288 p·.3d 1045 (Utah 2012) .
.U.

·Mr. Noor's. Pre--Trial Interactions. with Mr. Sikora
15.

Mt."Noor .met with.Mr. Sikor,t' prior .to trial. (Noor Affidavit, attac11ed as lixhibi~

16 ..

Mr. . Sikora would not 1et Mr. Noorte]_l his·versiou of what.happened 01i May 28:,

F.)

.io·o9 . .(:ra.)
1'7'..

'No 01~e tr~~J~ted th~ polJ¢e r~p~~to·"Mr1 No·ot- such.1]iatJLe.u,l~~r.sto·od ~harwa~

jn :tb,e •~port (ld.}

t 8~ ·

Mr.. 'Sij<ota did not teJ.l· Mr. Noor how jhe c)larg_es ,~~uld; afi~ct lns: iribn1~ation.

sta~ .. (ld,)
19~

Mr~ Sikora did not tell Mr. Noot that he ·could be deported if he we~{ to trial and.

was GOliv~cte4 of the 6harges:against pirt1. (id.).

4
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Ill.

Mr. Noor"s Version of the Events of May 28, 2009.
20.

-If Mr. Noor bad been allowed to tell Mr. Sikora his version .of the events. He

would have told JY.[r_ Sikora that he and J.E. would. often talk, and lie believed that J~E. was
tomantjcallyinterestcd in him.
2L

He would have told Mr. Sikora that he ·believed tlw.1 J.E. was jealous when- .he

began a :relaJionspjp with anoth~r person.

.,

IV~

22~

Hewciuld' b~ve told·Mr. Sikora tha,the did not enter·J.E.'s apartment on May 28~

23..

He would also have told Mr~ Sikora that he-had never entered J.E.,s. apartn1.~nt

JVIr. SU<.ora's Representation of Mr. Noor.
24.

Mr. Noor had a difficult i.ime understanding the translation

ar trial!

(Noor

Affidavit, attached as Exhibit F.)

25..

J)ue to Qlc lack of adequate translation, he d1_d D:ot know what wa,s goit1g.on;-. (1d)

26.

Mr. Noor: did not \irid~rs~cling his a~<?use~ J.E."s: testimony -~gain.st him... (!d)

i-7~:

1'1'~· Noor fold· Mr~ Silcora: tnat he, was pavin•g g.diffi~ult tim~ und~rs~dfug,. \,ut

1''1r~ Sikora did not 49 artytbing.
2s·:

(/cl)'

Attria:ttbe State ofUfahargti¢d "[J.E.] haEHl,O niotive to lie.

·wny dtcJ{J..E.} ·con:fo··

her~ a year. a~o to a preliminary hearfng, and iestify; and tell peop)e these i_igly; ugly thlngs-about

what happened tc;, her? Why is she h~r~ today? Why, clid· she hrrtq_edfutely call'. tl1e police?;,.
(Tdal Transcript 163:13.-17~ attached~s ExbibitH.)
29,

At trial; Mr. Sikora did not ask J.E. ff sh~ was: romantically iJ;i.terest fo

Mr. Noor~-

an~ if LE. wasJealous,ofMr. Noor's relationship with another person.

5
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30.-

At tJ.iaj., lvir. S.ikot~ cUd noi ·call any witn.ess~s on "behalf of;tvfr~ Noor,..

31.

At trial, Mr. Sikora did not ask about the· lack

of fingerprint DNA~ or any other

pbys·ical evidence showing that Mr.. .Noor was in J.E. 's apartm~nt.
· 32.

After Mr, Noor was found guilty. Mr. SiJcor;3. appcaJed. that convi~tio~ In :that

:appeal';. Mr. Sikor_a, iirgµ~d ''Mr. Noor maintains. that the ev'ip~nc~ shows $it he did

undersµmg. hi$ condµct iil[lE/s]i ~:partI+tent to be lewd, as bi~ h..ackg1;01.i.iid ~~ve h.frp_

not

no t~ason to

expect.hi~-.actions-to cause affront. or-aiarm to [J~E.].:\ Mr. Si~ora ·aiso argu~d. that ';.Mr~ Noor's
ititenticti:l to·express-his- 'love~ for [J.E.] r~sulted in condµcttha~ by our·stan~ards1 ·seeins. ~leatly

•criminal~ but conduct is. not crin1inaL if it lacks a culpab.1¢ rrie11tal state. J3ut relative. to the
vio1ence agajnst women that he experienced for nearly his entire life', his 'intention iii remaining

in

[J.R:s] a:partment an,d his subsequent conduct appear to be severely misguided attempts at

expressing love ~nd affection.. He repeatedly told her that he loved her, a11d be· seemed to think
.liis actions were expressive of that'' (Appellant's Brief, attached as Exlnn'it G.}.
33~

J3u,l1 accordirr~ to tvJ).f/~001\ this is· not what )lij}:fpeµ¢d~

34.'

·in ~ddifion, ~- Not,r's: pr~~sentencin~i report stat~&- that ·''(ajqco~dfu~ to.

Ipmijgratio1i fu.1d ·Custom 'Enforcement (I~E) Agent Ryan. Ove,rto,h.,: tpe, .~~fen~~t· e!ltered the,.

United States on Jniy 14; 20.04,. throu~h New Yor.k. _Cify as·,a refu&ee~ He then c\dJu~ted;Jns..s~tus

on April 1,?', 2008. and be9arne a legal 1?ermanent resident,. so he is legt;i.1 hut Ts not a US Cifizen.flowever due to; having 1;>¢en coil:victed qfthe. pre~~nt ~hatg¢s; an ICE detainer h~s· been;pla,~e O!!
the defendant ~t the: Salt ~alee. County Jail. Agent Overton ;stated th~ qefe~dan:twilt h~ve; jo $ee-·

an lrrftnigratiori' Jud&e ~'btjt ~1 most likeiy b~ ordered ~ep~rted."'

(Pj~s_enten.~n~. -~epoit~

attachec1' as·Exhibit I.)
6.
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3·5,

According

to Mr.

Noor:, this information regarding his ·immigration status is

incorrecL

ARGUMENT
·~r. Sikora.Was· Per Se Ineffeetiye fQr Failirig To Seek.a Competent lnt~rpreter for
Mr. Noor at Trial.

Generally, the Supreme Court presumes that an atto'mey .is• compete11t
-so th~ burden rests on the

~ccu~gd to demonstrate a y9nstittitional violatio~. But th~ ·supr~mf?

.Court held that there are. ''circumstances
of 1itigatit'Lg. their efl;ect

to provide- counsel,,

in

that are so likely to pr~judic~ the. a·ccuse~ th.at thy cost

a particular case· is unjustified.

Most obvfous, of .course~ is the

complet¢· denia1 of counsel. Th_e presumption that co.unsd ~ s as~ist&nce is. esse.ntiW requires us to
conclude that a -trial is unfair if the accused is denied. counsel at a critical stage of trial.
· Similarly,. if COUJJ.S~l eii.titely fails to subject the prosecution~s case

to

me~ningful adversarial

-testing;, then there has· been a denial of $beth Amcnd~enttjg4ts L4at ~es the adversary process

'itself prestgnptivelY unr~U~ble:"· United Stales· v~ Crontc., 46·6:. U.R 648,. 658-59· (19~4).

In

J?resutried to have preju4iced a _defendant Specifically:i when a defendant is "d~rived .of hi~
right to cormb.tuµcate with bis aJtomey [and] lw]here be artd· his attorney (?ould.not commililicate

in a-shared fa,nguage [there] is no way in w~_ich the two could. ~ave. aµie~ngt\tl ·~ttcm"iey-c}ient
· r~la,tionship .during trial. guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Thus;. the Cronic !?resumption of

·prejudfoeapplies.;' Gonza!ez.11• Phillips~ 1095 F,.Supp-. 2d 893', 902 (RD. Jvlicli. 200l).
Here Mr. Noor fa~d a difficult time understanding the. translation at trial .. u·ue to the lack
2

of adeguate trans]atiori) he «;lid notkn.ow what ,vas going 011. Mr. Noor- t~1d lvfr. -Sikora thaUu~
was. having a difficult time. ~4erstanding, but Mr. Silmj;a did nqt do anytllirtg. A~ a result, Mf.
7
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Noor di4 not ~v~n underst~d his. accuser~s testiniony against him. Under these circumstances,.

Mr- Noor was deprived of his right to communicate with his attomey, dunng trial .as guaranteed
•by the Sixth Amendment and ther~ is. a piesun:iption that N.fr. Noor was prejudiced~ ln ·short, this,
sifuatioil is so J.ike]y to· prejudice Mr. Noor that the Court should Md ~t ~~ Silcora; was per .se
meffective for fail41g: to ensure that Mr. Noor understood what was happening at tria}~ ~specjally
since Mr. Noor.com.plained about it to Mr-: Sikora!

Even if the C(;url Were· TO Apply the Stricicla1td Standard, M:r,, Noor.1.s Cqun~¢1 w~s
Still Ine:ffectiV~ for Failing To Seek a Coinpetertt Ofntetpret~r for M1\ Noor· at Triak
Even if the Court; UI)der these cir~umstanc~s, were to apply the Strickland ;standard fo

Mr;. Noor~s ineffective of counsel <;,laim7 J'v1r. Noor would. still succeea \,Jtah Courts L.'evaluate
whether a defendant

bas recyived ineffective assistauce of counsel under the, two-:part. test

established by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S,Ct~ 20521 80 L. Ed.2c;l 674 (t984) ..

First, the d~fendant must show that counsel;s. performance was defic~ent. · S.e·co~d, tj1~

must show that th~ deficient pei{()~atJG~. prejlidi9eq. the ~~f~p.se:.~t

if i9; 219. p.34· 396.:. .i\s· to· th~ t~f pad~

4ef~!ld~t

.~regg,v.. 8_t.a:le.,. 2012 •U't 32~.

'<the. dcfe.iu;j~t ·illilst. qemo11sttate tba.~·

¢0:unsets·

pctfonnaJ;J,ce w~ .sq. deffoi.ent·as to, faU below an objectiV~ standard fot reasonab!en~ss.;~ !di at, ,1
20~· As

·

to·· the second. part, ''the d'(?foild?UJ.t rq\].st show that counsel'·s· c;lefic~e~t J?erfoi:m~n(?e:

preJudiced the defense."'; id at 121.
A.

Mr. Sikora 7s ~ep-r~sen,tl\tion Wa~·Un..re~soqabfo.

As to- ihe first .part of the: Striclda1ul analysis-·reaso.nableness:, nttr(ler•ils: ¢0\zjs· 'hay~

recQgciieq. ~ ,eotmse} 's Qbli_ga,tlon to m~e ·sure· that bis qlient ·understands. a.rut: parqci~~tes,·ifr his, .
own d¢fcnse. See e.g~·; Chaco y, Tiflood, 36 F~3d 14~9~ 1465 (9th Cj.r~ i994) {over1:ttrned on other
grotind.s). (''.A:ti accurate and· ~om~1et~ translation of ·all ~ttorney--clie1;1t tjormnJtl}lcatio11s: w~
R
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necessary to ensure that [defendant] rec.eived effective ~ssistance of counseL In the. absence of
such translation; (defendant]· could not receive ·such assistance.''); United States
F.2d 12,

v.

Can~ion., 488

14 (1st Cir. 1973) ("Clearly-, the rjght to confront witnesses would be .meaningless if the

accused
could not understand ·their testimonv- ... and the effectiveness.
ofcross.;exaniination
would.
.
.
.
.
..
-

-

-

be severely hampered.'}

Here,

Mr. Sikora. should have understood, his obligation to make sure

that Mr~ Noor

understood what was happening. at ttiaL Mr. Siko!a should 1;iave understood the importati~e 9f
allowing Mr. Noor to participate in his· owii defense. Yet, al tnat Mr~ Noor told Mr. Sikora that

he was· having a difficult time understanding the· translation at trial, but Mr. Si.l{ota did not do
anything. Mr~ Silcora· faihrre to obje~t or otherwise takes steps to ·obtain-another interpreter at
trial w~s deficient as to fa:).I below 811 objective standard for reasonableness.

B.

Mr. Sikora's Representation Prejudiced Mr. Noor.

As to the seco1,1d part of the Strickla114 analysiSc--:pr~judiqe!' the

Ptah Supre~e Court··

explains that" "[pJrejudice 1s sho:wn wher~ tl1er~ is a reasonable ptob~ilfcy that, butfor ~:tfuscl ~s

µilprofessi9nal errors, the result of the proceeding ·would have been diffcr.ent.
A reasonable.
.

probabiHty is a-probability ~cient to undei;tnitie confide11ce inthe·out~9me/' Id. at ,r 71.
Here,. Mr~. Noor was. prejudiced by not ~derstanding the trial proceedings, for ·\wo

reasons as follows:
First, there was only one witness to the alleged crime

at trial-·the

alleged victim J.E.

-She testified that Mr. Noor harassed her in her apartment. If Mr. Noor had understood i;E. 's
testimony, he could have told Mr. Sikora that rE. was romantic?llY interested in him, and she

was .jeaious of his relationship with another person!

So Lhere was a rnoti.ve for J.,B. to He~ On

9
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· cross~examination, Mr. Sikot~ did not ask about thes·e issues.

In closing, 1-he State of Utah

bolstered the testimony of J.E. by arguing that ·she had no motive to tie. Specifi?ally, the State
argued 'tWhy did [LE~] come here a year ago to a preliminary bearing; and testify,. and· tell
people these ugly, ugly things· about what happened to her? Why is she l1ere today? Why did

she immediately call the po)ice?'' (Trial Transcript at 163: 13-17, attached as Exhibit H.)
Sikora had· challenged J.E/s credibility and prQvided the jury '1: reasott ~s

ff Mr&

to wp.y lE: <woy]d lie~

there is re~sonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Mr. Noor.
Second, J.E. accused Mr. Noor of go.ing ~to her apartment and harassing her.. ·1vtr. N~or,
however~ contends that be was never in J.E.'s apartment. If M:r; Noor had understooci the qfal

proceedings, he wouid have b~en ~bl~- to a~k _Mt.. Sikora lo cross-examine the. State,.s· witnesses
as to whether the State had any fingerprint, DNA, or other _physical evjdence that fylr. N9or was

in .J.E.' s apartment-there was none. If Mt. Sikora bad d_one so, this -Wqulcl have undermined the
State's case against Mr. Noor. If the jury knew there was rtq fingerprint: DNA,_, or. bthetr physical
~vi(le~ce placing Mr. Noor-;insjde. J.E. 1 s apa.ru,nent~:the~e is· BJ reasonable probal?Hit1 thaJ tht'.:jiµ:y.

would. not have convi¢ted iv,rr! Noor,

m.

Mr.. Sikora Wi1$ Ineffective, Because H~ Would Not.~et Mi\ NoQt Md iir IDs. 9wn.
Defense ·Prior to Trial

.

Pursuant- to the Strickland two-part test as set forth above~ Mr/~ikor~,~-as ~s9 iri~ff~ytive
because Mr. Sikora would not let Mt. Noor tell his version of what happened on May 28, 2009~

A.

l\'lr. $ikora's Representation Was·Unreasonabie.

As to the first part -of the Strickland analysis-reasonableness:, "[d]~fonse C(?Uns(?l loscs a

va1i;iable· resource

if his or her ~iient cannot understand the ~harge and' supporting facts~

Significance of detailed factual reptese,-itatiops may escape the Ja~er., but not the· cli~nt whq is
10
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fa1niliar with th~ circumstances surrounding his case. Ultimate .success in c9urt m~y depend ori.careful pre"."trial investigation· based on hints from the client. Inadequate input from the client

wl10 failed to -understand .the evidence to be relied uport by' the government cannot be cured by

the. presetrce Qf an official

cour~ interpreter at a heacing .or at trial.'~ U.nited Stq.t~s l'~ Nlosquera,

816R.Supp.168) 175 (E~D~N.Y. 1993).

Here, :rvrr. Sikora should have known. that it was important to bea,r Mr. Noor'$ version 9f
what happen¢d on May 28, 2009. · Also,· Mr.. Sikora should· have known !hat Mr.
·valuable ·and important resource· in .aiding

fo "his· own, defense.

Noor was. _a.

lt \vas unreasonable- for Mr.

_·Sikora to. refuse to let Mr. Noor tell his side of the story~ Jt 1s unrea.soiiable for Mt ·Sikora fail to
make sure that that Mr. Noor µt,derstood the police report .so that Mr.-. Noor could aid in his own
defense.

B.

Mr. Sikora's Representation Pre.in.diced Mr. Noor.

As• to the second _part of.tlie Strickland an~lysis-·praj\ldi~e= Mr. Noor- ~as prejuruced· for ·
i-wo !~as9rts ·as follows:

First., as $tated··above~ th.ere V{as only one· witness to the·alleg;ed crhrte-the atleged vfctini
J.K

.J.E. testified that fyfr. Noor wc11t foto her apartment to harass- her~

If Mr. Sikora would. ha.ye·

allowed Mr.. Noor t~ participa~e in bis oWD: clefense~ Mt. Sikora would p.aye. t~n9wi~ that

M\ Noor·

believed that J.E .. lied because she was'jealous of Mr. Noor artd the· person he was dating, · Mr~
Sikota, ~rould have bee11·able to inve~tigate this issue~ Mr. Sikora wouid. have been a,ble to tajk tQ
Mr.

Noofs b~othcr, the p~rson Mr-

Noor was ~a.ting, and· other people fu. the; apartment

to.

support this theocy. If iytr. Sikora had do1:1e sc;,, there was a,- r~sonable proba]?i1ity that Mr.

Noot''s a,c¢ouni of what happened would have been bolstered~ and

.LE. credib1lity would have

11
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been damaged -such that there i's a reasonab1e probability that fue j.ury would have acqJJit1ed Mr.
Noor.
·secon~, if~. Sili:ota·had allowed Mt. Noor t9 participate.inhi's own defense, Mr. S~ora:

would .have known that Mr~ Npor ,,,as never ll,l J.E..' s aparttnent Mr•. s·ikora would hav~ been
,able to fove•stigate t~e-lack of..fin~erprint; DNA, an~ .physical,~vi~euce t6'

show {ha{ Mr~N•or

·

was in r. E.?s apartment. If fyfr. S.ikora had clo.ne so, there: was a:reasonijb}e. probability tliat the

jury·wottld have ~cqttifte~· Mr.Noor for iack:0£ physical eviclence.
N.

Mr.. Sikora. Was Incffectiv~, .for }!aili~g. T·o. !\~vise Mr. No_or of' the ]Usk of·
l)cporfation ifa·Juty·Fo~nff Hhn (h1Uty~. ·
Pursuap.t to the Strickland two:..pc:µ1_ test ~ set fortl1 abov~, Mr~ Sil~ora was also ineffective

be¢ause Mr. Si\<ora failed to ac:lvise Mr~ Noor of the risk of dcporation if a jury found him guilty.
,4.
~

Mr; Sikora's. Repres'l~ntation V\Tas,Unrcas<mable-.

to the fitsi part of ~he $trii/fs]a}uJ analysis--.:reasonableness, lhe Supreme Courl has

. held tl1~t l:'[t]he w~Igh~ ·of':pr~v:a:iling· J}fOf~~sjo11aj p9rins: supports· th~~ view that co~el llll!$

the deportatlo111isl~.. A~d tl1f~, Court h~ re9ogm#4 th~ imp9rlance to,

,~dvis~ her ~11etJ.t ·regarding
..
.
.

'

.

'

.

.

.

.

.

..

.

~-

.

the client 9:fp.r~servlll~ the tight 16. temaiii ~ th~ Um!¢0: States an4 preserying {Ji~ po~silJ¥ity ¢f
1

~i$cretional ~li~f frqm deportatfori.'~ fadilla 11; .K~ntuqkp? 559 lJ.S~ 356;- 357 (2.010) :{ho1ding
that it ·was ®easoi:t~ble fof counsel t9 .fail to advise a "C!{~I1.t regardin~ the dsl~ of clep6r:ta,tjoit, i11
· the cpntext.of a·guiitypfoa)~
Herc, Mt. Sikora did not: tell Mr._ Nqor how tlie

charges· WQul4 Qr 9ould aff~~t. his

imniigrati.on sta.tus., Nor did Mr~ SQcora tell ¥r·· Noor that h¢ coulcl b~ d.eported -if-hewe1;1t to-trl.?1
~d was ~onvicted· <?f the charges a~ainst-hin'i.

rn view ~f th~ Supreme Court.'s i-¢cogriitton ofthe

12
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prevailing professional norm that counsel must so advise, lvlr. Sikora was unreasonable not to do
so.

B.

·Mr. Noor Vt'as Prejudiced+

As to the. -second part of the Strickland analysis-prejudice, Defendant must show that
a,bsent collnS¢l's'. Ui.lreasonabl~ acts ''there 'is· a reasonable. probability of ~ more favorable

outcome." State v. Person, 2096 UT App 288, 113., 140 P3d' 584.

Here Mr~ Si~ora failed to teU Mr. Noor that he would be deported if found gµilty of th~

charges· agrunst him~ If Mr. Sikora artd Mr. Noor understood that .Mr. Noor-= if he was found
gU1lty could be deported back to Somalia-a place where Mr. Noor is at risk of death, torture;
7

and oiher cruel, fohuman, ot degrading treatment-they could have pursued a plea: bargain to a

iesser crime that would not result in his deportation. (Somalia 2014. HtLman ru·ghts Repo~
·attached as Exhibit J.) Tn addition, as stated above;, ther~ was. only one witness to the alleged

·c~e,. ,LE, If Mr'! Sikor~ wonl4 lu~ve told the: State of J.E/s

motive .to .lie and if M1i;. Sikora

would have. pressed. the Stat~'s lack of physical evidenc~, there is· a: reasonable p;rol;,abil~fy that
'(he State would hav~ o:fl~re_d Jvlt Noor a piea cleat

hi addition) ·th~e is ~ reasonable probapility

that M:i;-. Sikora could have and· should have. convinced· Mr. Noor to accept that deal' fu.. vfow of
the serious risk 9f deportation back to Somalia.
CONCLUSION

For the- reasons statetl, Mr~ Noor's petition for post-•convictiOn l'ellef-sb~mld be granted"
In addition, Mr_ Noor respectfully request that the Court allow Mr_. Noor 1b cotiqucl discovery on
the factual issues smTounding tbi$ petition.

13
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In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah
OSMAN MOHAMMED NOOR,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

..

Petitioner,
Case No. 130907566
vs.
Judge Vernice S. Trease
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.
In this action, Petitioner Osman Mohammed Noor seeks relief under the Postconviction
Remedies Act (PCRA), see Utah Code Ann.§§ 78B-9-101, et seq., from his conviction and
sentence for burglary, forcible sexual abuse, and lewdness.Currently before the Court is
Respondent the State of Utah's (the State) Motion for Summary Judgment. After reviewing the
materials submitted by the parties in their briefs and at oral argument, !agree with the State that
Mr. Noor's claims are time-barred, and therefore, I GRANT the State's motion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
Mr. Noor was charged with burglary, forcible sexual abuse, and lewdness on July 6,
2009. Because Mr. Noor has difficulty speaking and understanding English, he required the
assistance of interpreters throughout the proceedings, including in his meetings with counsel, at
the preliminary hearing, and at trial.His case was tried to a jury and on January 4, 2011, a jury
convicted him of all three charges.
On February 25, 2011, Mr. Noor was sentenced to serve two concurrent prison terms of
one to fifteen years. Following his conviction and sentence, Mr. Noor filed a timely appeal. The
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in a ruling dated July 12, 2012, see State v. Noor,
2012 UT App 187,283 P.3d 543, and the Utah Supreme Court denied his certiorari petition on
October 17, 2012, see State v. Noor, 288 P.3d 1045 (Utah 2012). Mr. Noor did not pursue an
additional appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
Mr. Noor initiated the instant action when he filed his original petition for postconviction
relief (the Original Petition) on November 5, 2013. The Original Petition stated three claims for
postconviction relief: (1) Ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on trial counsel's failure to
adequately set forth grounds supporting a m(?tion for directed verdict, (2) the trial court used a
jury instruction that incorrectly stated the elements of the forcible sexual abuse statute, and (3)
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because on appeal, counsel failed to raise trial
counsel's ineffectiveness or the erroneous jury instruction.

1

Inasmuch as this matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment I view the allegations and the
inferences stemming from those allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. Noor, who is the nonmoving party.
SeeRoss v. State, 2012 UT 93, 'if 18, 293 P.3d 345.
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Along with the Original Petition, Mr. Noor filed a motion seeking the appointment of
counsel. The Court granted the motion and eventually, current counsel was appointed to
represent Mr. Noor in these proceedings. After counsel was appointed, the Court held a status
conference on April 27, 2015. At the status conference, the Court asked Mr. Noor's counsel ifhe
intended to file an amended or supplemental petition. Counsel responded that the Original
Petition was inadequate and that he intended to file an amended petition "to try and put some
substance to it." In the absence of any objection from the State, the Court granted Mr. Noor leave
to amend the Original Petition. Mr. Noor filed his amended petition (the Amended Petition) with
this Court on August 27, 2015.
The Amended Petition omitted all of the claims for relief that had been set forth in the
Original Petition. In their place, Mr. Noor asserted four new claims for relief. These included
two claims alleging that Mr. Noor's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he
failed to secure an interpreter to adequately help Mr. Noor understand the proceedings at trial; an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on allegations that problems with the interpreter
and a lack of communication between Mr. Noor and counsel prevented Mr. Noor from assisting
in his own defense, and a claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to inform Mr. Noor of the immigration consequences stemming from a conviction for the
crimes he was charged with.
ANALYSIS

The State now seeks summary judgment in its favor on all of Mr. Noor's claims.
Summary judgment is only appropriate where "the record shows that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." Ross
v. State, 2012 UT 93, ,I 18,293 P.3d 345 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the
State asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on several grounds. I need only
address one of those grounds, however, because the undisputed facts demonstrate that Mr.
Noor's claims in the Amended Petition are time-barred under the PCRA.
Under the PCRA, a petitioner seeking postconviction relief must file their petition
"within one year after the cause of action has accrued."Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(1). A cause
of action accrues on the latest of several dates, only one of which has been raised here:"the last
day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the ... United States Supreme Court, if no
petition for writ of certiorari is filed." Id. § 78B-9-107(2)(c).The Utah Supreme Court denied Mr.
Noor's certiorari petition on October 17, 2012, which gave Mr. Noor until January 15, 2013 to
file a certiorari petition with the United States Supreme Court. See Sup. Ct. R. 13 (stating that a
petition for certiorari must be filed "within 90 days after entry ofthe order denying discretionary
review"). Consequently, under the PCRA, Mr. Noor had to file his claims for relief in this Court
by January 15, 2014.
There is no question that the Original Petition was timely filed before the limitations
period expired. However, the claims raised in the Original Petition are no longer before the Court
because the Amended Petition-which superseded the Original Petition-omitted all of Mr.
Noor's original claims for relief. Thus, the only claims that are currently before the Court are the
new claims for relief that have been asserted in the Amended Petition.

2
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Here, the State argues that all of the claims in the Amended Petition are time-barred
because Mr. Noor brought all of those claims on August 27, 2015-more than a year and a half
after the statute of limitations expired. In response, Mr. Noor does not dispute that the claims in
the Amended Petition were brought after the limitations period expired. Instead, Mr. Noor argues
that the claims should be deemed timely because the Court granted him·leave to amend the
Original Petition and, in any event, the new claims in the Amended Petition relate back to the
claims in the Original Petition. I disagree with both of Mr. Noor's arguments.2
Turning to the first argument, Mr. Noor argues that the Court should deem his claims in
the Amended Petition timely because the Court granted Mr. Noor leave to amend the Original
Petition at the status conference held on April 27, 2015. However, at that status conference, the
limitations period was not raised by the parties or addressed the Court. To the contrary, counsel
for Mr. Noor only stated that he was requesting leave to amend the Original Petition "to try and
put some substance to it," and that he needed some time to "ascertain whether there are any other
issues that need to be raised" in the amended pleading. At no point did counsel make any
mention of the limitations period and its impact on the new claims. Therefore, the statute of
limitations issue was not before the Court, nor did the Court address that issue when the Court
granted Mr. Noor leave to amend his petition.
Furthermore, even if the statute of limitations issue would have been raised, it is doubtful
that the Court had any authority to extend the limitations period at the time of the status
conference. Indeed, to extend the limitations period at that time would have required the Court to
ignore the fact that the limitationsperiod had expired more than one yearbefore the conference.
Mr. Noor points to no authority that would have allowed the Court to reinstate and extend the
limitations period at that point. In the absence of any authority to indicate otherwise, and in light
of the fact that the legislature has sharply restricted a district court's ability to consider an
untimely petitionfor postconviction relief, see Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46,, 91,234 P.3d
1115, it does not appear that the Court had any authority to extend the limitations period when it
granted Mr. Noor's leave to amend the Original Petition. 3
Turning to the second argument, Mr. Noor asserts that the claims in the Amended
Petition relate back to the claims in the Original Petition, and therefore, are timely .I disagree.
Under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an amended pleading that would
otherwise run afoul of the statute of limitations may be considered timely where the amended
pleading "relates back"to the original pleading. See Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). 4 To relate back, the
2

In his current briefs, Mr. Noor does not argue that a different limitations period applies under the PCRA, nor does
Mr. Noor argue that the limitations period was tolled for any other reason. Therefore, the Court only addresses the
arguments raised by Mr. Noor in his memorandum opposing the motion at bar.
3

As the State notes, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that Utah courts may reach the merits of an untimely
petition where application of the limitations period would result in an ~'egregious injustice." See Gardner v. State,
2010 UT 46,193,234 P.3d 1115. However, Mr. Noor has not raised that exception in this case, and therefore, the
Court does not address the applicability of that exception to Mr. Noor's petition.
4

Under the PCRA, petitions for postconviction relief are governed by Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-102(1). If Rule 65C does not address a procedural matter, the Utah Rules
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new claim must "ar[i]se out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth ... in the original
pleading." Id. In other words, both the original and new claims must be "tied to a commoncore of
operative facts." Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 664 (2005).
Here, it is clear that even the most liberal reading of the allegations in the Original and
Amended Petitions cannot sustain a reasonable inference that the claims in the Amended Petition
arise from the same factual allegations as the claims in the Original Petition. Indeed, the Original
Petition contains no allegations that relate to the claims asserted in the Amended Petition.
As discussed above, the claims in the Amended Petition are based on alleged problems
with Mr. Noor's interpreter during the trial, meetings with trial counsel and other legal
proceedings, and.on defense counsel's alleged failure to inform Mr. Noor of the immigration
consequences of a conviction. The Original Petition makes no mention of any of those
allegations. While the Original Petition does mention Mr. Noor's difficulty speaking and
understanding English, the Original Petition does not discuss any problems with the interpreters
at trial or in Mr. Noor's communication with counsel. Instead, the Original Petition only alludes
to Mr. Noor's difficulty with the English language in connection with the claim that Mr. Noor
could not have fqrmed the intent necessary to have committed the underlying
crimes.Consequently, it cannot reasonably be inferred that the allegations and claims in the
Amended Petition are based on the same operative facts and claims as the Original Petition. In
light of that conclusion, I agree with the State that the claims in the Amended Petition do not
relate back to the claims in the Original Petition. Therefore, the claims in the Amended Petition
are time-barred.
Based on the foregoing, I agree with the State that the undisputed facts demonstrate that
Mr. Noor'sclaims in his petition are time-barred under the PCRA. Accordingly, I GRANT the
State's motion for summary judgment. 5 Counsel for the State is designated to prepare an
appropriate order consistent with this Ruling.
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2016.

Vernice S r~ase
Third District Court Judge
of Civil Procedure Apply. See id Here, Rule 65C does not address the amendment of a petition to add new claims.
Consequently, any such amendments are governed by Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
5

In some instances, an amended petition that does not relate back to the original petition should be considered a new
petition and be filed in a separate proceeding. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 2015 UT 38, 1121-22, 345 P.Jd 737
(concluding that a petition filed as an amended petition should have been filed as a new petition in a separate
proceeding where the new claims did not relate back to the original petition and were based on new evidence). In the
case at bar, the Amended Petition may represent such a petition. However, that issue has not been briefed by the
parties, who have focused on the timeliness and merits of the claims in the Amended Petition. Therefore, in the
absence of anything to suggest that the Amended Petition should have been filed as a separate postconviction
proceeding, I assume that the Amended Petition is properly before the Court in the case at bar.
4
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